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I. INTRODUCTION
A teaspoonful of semen and a few minutes are all that are
required for the creation of a child or the transmission of a
sexually transmitted disease.' In addition to sexual intercourse
(sex), assisted reproductive technology2 is also available as a
method of conception and possible disease transmission. Sex,
1. See Sarah Litvinoff, The Sperm Bandits, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 29, 1998,
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/the-sperm-bandits-1188003.html ("A
teaspoonful of liquid has once again found itself at the centre of a courtroom
battle.").
2. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last updated Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART)]. ("Assisted reproductive
technology.. .includes "procedures [that] involve surgically removing eggs from a
woman's ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning
them to the woman's body [as embryos] or donating them to another woman.");
see infra note 31.
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assisted reproductive technology, and their results face non-
uniform legal treatment. This Article will address, analyze, and
propose solutions to the many incongruous treatments of sex-
related and assisted reproductive technology-related
consequences in family law. For example, privacy and autonomy
give way to public health concerns when a state court
compensates a plaintiff for the unwanted transmission of a
sexually transmitted disease-, but state courts state that they are
guided by these same concepts of privacy and autonomy when
they reject contraceptive fraud claims4 and the requests of other
males for the abatement of child support when both unwanted
sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted children are
generally "transmitted" through the same act-unprotected sex.5
Similarly, anonymous donors of eggs and sperm are legislatively
exempt from child support obligations, whereas courts deem male
requests to be compensated for contraceptive fraud as an attempt
to escape a fatherly obligation even though either of the
biological parents could finance that obligation.6 State court
decisions, such as these, are not based on a desire to provide
"adequate support" for the child but instead based on cultural
stereotypes which focus on the outdated nuclear family, and
attempt to sustain the male role of "provider" for the family, no
matter the context.7
Thus, the law inconsistently treats anonymous donors of eggs
or sperm and those who have produced children through sex,
whether voluntarily or involuntarily. This inconsistency also
exists in the reproductive market, a market which effectively
ends upon fertilization.8 The first commercial sperm bank in the
3. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Ct. App. 1984);
Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620 (Ct. App. 1980).
4. See Behr v. Redmond, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97, 116 (Ct. App. 2011)
discussed infra at 60-64 and in accompanying text.
5. See Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 431 (Ct. App. 1983); see
also infra note 53.
6. See infra note 236.
7. See infra note 168.
8. For a discussion of child support, see infra notes 123-130 and
accompanying text.
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United States opened in 1970.9 Now, sperm and eggs are
available from donors who are compensated at rates that range
from $60-$75 for sperm donationo (and up to $100 for men with
graduate degreesi) to $8,000 per egg donation to university
hospitals12 and even up to $100,000 for the eggs of well-educated
women.13 Vials of sperm sell for $250-$400 each, and eggs
generally sell for $4,500.14 Thus, eggs and sperm are assets at the
time they leave their producer, but once they enter another's
body through sex, the eggs and sperm are no longer an assets to
the producer; rather, they become a liability to the producer, as
indicated by the imposition of child support obligations.15
The market ends upon fertilization because market-based
structures cede to the "best interests of the child" standard-
which mandates child support.16 However, as this Article will
9. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 35 (2006).
10. See Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A
New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 14 (2003)
(stating that sperm donors are compensated at $60 per donation); see also SPAR,
supra note 9, at 39 ("[Donors] contribute a fixed number of times over a
relatively short period and receive around $75 per specimen.").
11. Jennifer Adaeze Anyaegbunam, Ivy League Women Get Offers for
Their Eggs, CNN HEALTH (Aug. 12, 2009, 10:49AM), http://thechart.blogs.cnn.
com/2009/08/12/ivy-league-women-get-offers-for-their-eggs/.
12. Weill Med. Coll. of Cornell Univ., Compensation, EGG DONATION,
http://www.eggdonorcornell.com/why-donate/compensation.html (last visited
Oct. 5, 2012); see also Egg Donor Compensation, N.Y.U. LANGONE MED. CTR.,
http://www.
nyueggdonor.org/egg-donor-compensation (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) ("Donors
who complete a successful donation . . . will receive $8,000 as compensation for
your time, effort and inconvenience, which is paid by the NYU School of
Medicine.").
13. Anyaegbunam, supra note 11 (noting that some agencies pay well over
the prices recommended by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine in
order to target females attending certain ivy league schools).
14. SPAR, supra note 9, at 39. The typical cost of sperm is $300 and the
typical cost of eggs is $4,500. Id. at 213.
15. For a discussion of child support, see infra notes 129-32 and
accompanying text. See also infra notes 230-235 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the absolution of child support liability for anonymous sperm
donors.
16. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/best-interest.pdf
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show, the best interests of the child standard is ignored by
artificial insemination statutes, which allow all anonymous
donors, and some known donors, to escape child support
liability.17
In spite of the negative circumstances that can surround the
creation of a child-fraud, contravention of artificial
insemination statutes, and even criminal activity-courts find
the child's best interest to be more important than those of a
father who has involuntarily assumed parenthood through male
contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, or statutory rape. 18
Furthermore, husbands and "duped donors" sometimes receive
more protection from unwanted parental obligations through
state statutes than assault victims.19 This is particularly
shocking in light of state courts' implications of a strong right to
avoid procreation.20
The aforementioned inconsistencies in family law merit
attention both at a societal level, because these inconsistencies
are based on outdated stereotypes and images of the family,21
and at the level of legal tradition, because the identified
inconsistencies in family law undermine the legal system's efforts
("All States, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have statutes
requiring that the child's best interests be considered whenever specified types
of decisions are made regarding a child's custody, placement, or other critical
life issues.").
17. See infra Part VII and VIII.
18. See infra notes 124-28 and Part VI.D.
19. See infra Parts VI.B for a discussion of failed contraceptive fraud
claims made by Sexual Assault victims as opposed to the successful
contraceptive fraud claims of a male in the assisted reproduction context as
discussed in Part VII.B., especially notes 274-5 and accompanying text.
20. See Melissa Boatman, Bringing Up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an
Equitable Framework for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes After Divorce, 37
U. BALT. L. REV. 285, 308 (2008) ("[Cjourts generally have concluded that the
right to avoid procreation outweighs the right to biological parenthood."); see
also Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 WL 886561, at *3 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) ("Our own Tennessee Supreme Court has stated, 'the
right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal
significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation."'
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)).
21. See infra Part VI.B.2.
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at consistency.22 Many scholars have argued for uniformity at
the level of constitutional law, federal law as a general matter,
and state law through the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (formed in 1892).23 This Article goes
beyond prevailing scholarship on uniformity to specific
arguments on family law and adheres to the overall position that
uniformity within various legal specialties should also be the goal
of legislation. Family law, especially family law governing
reproduction, child support, and sexual acts, has both civil and
criminal components, which should operate symbiotically.
Due to these developments, the question this Article seeks to
answer is: "How and why is semen treated differently by the law
depending on its context?" After identifying how semen is treated
differently depending on the legal issue (e.g., child support
liability, transmission of sexually transmitted diseases,24
transmission, etc.) being resolved and noting that most of the
reasons for treating semen differently are not compelling, this
Article offers solutions that aim to harmonize the treatment of
semen in family law.
In order to answer this question and formulate solutions, this
Article will conduct a survey of the various categories of semen
transfer and the corresponding legal treatment. The reasoning of
this Article is built on the following model, which identifies the
various methods of semen transfer along with their biological and
legal results:
22. See generally Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV.
1567 (2008) (giving an overview of uniformity and its role in constitutional and
federal law); see also Uniform Commercial Code Locator, LEGAL INFO. INST.
CORNELL UNIv. L. SCH., http://wwwlaw.cornell.eduluniform/ (last visited Oct. 1,
2012) (offering more on attempts to harmonize state law).
23. Id.
24. The terms "sexually transmitted disease" and "sexually transmitted
infection" are used interchangeably in this Article because the term sexually
transmitted disease or "disease" is still used in assorted court cases and legal
articles. "Sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs") are caused by infections
that are passed from one person to another during sexual contact. These
infections often do not cause any symptoms. Medically, infections are only
called diseases when they cause symptoms. That is why STDs are also called
'sexually transmitted infections."' Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs),
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/stds-
hiv-safer-sex-101.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
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As a result of the aforementioned legal uncertainties and an
analysis of the contexts focused on in the model above, in an
attempt to harmonize law, this Article argues that males who are
victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, or statutory rape
should not be liable for child support. Instead, they should be
treated in the same manner that the law treats anonymous
donors under the artificial insemination statute.25 Due to the
reasoning of several state court decisions, this Article introduces
model statutes in order to present a legislative embodiment of
this argument. The model statutes also address evidentiary and
non-disclosure issues that arise due to the private nature of
sexual relations and the use of technology in assisted
reproduction.
A. Product
Semen is a combination of spermatozoa (commonly and
hereinafter referred to as "sperm") and other secretions from the
male reproductive organs such as the testis and prostate. 26 Thus,
this Article broadly refers to semen instead of sperm alone due to
the mechanics of disease transmission, which are important to
this Article's scope.
25. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
26. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO LABORATORY MANUAL FOR THE EXAMINATION
AND PROCESSING OF HUMAN SEMEN 7 (5th ed. 2010).
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B. Method of Transmission/Distribution
Semen is a critical product in both reproduction and the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases. 27 In reproduction, the
successful entrance of sperm into an egg (known as
"fertilization") results in an embryo, then a fetus, and finally an
infant.28 This is true for both sex 29 and assisted reproduction.30
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
("CDC"), the term "assisted reproductive technology" includes:
[A]11 fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are
handled. In general, [assisted reproductive technology]
procedures involve surgically removing eggs from a woman's
ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and
returning them to the woman's body [as embryos] or donating
them to another woman. They do NOT include treatments in
which only sperm are handled (i.e., intrauterine-or artificial-
insemination) or procedures in which a woman takes medicine
27. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CONDOMS AND STDs: FACT
SHEET FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL 1 (2011) available at http://www.cdc.gov/
condomeffectiveness/docs/Condoms_andSTDS.pdf.
Some diseases, such as HIV infection, gonorrhea, chlamydia, and
trichomoniasis, are transmitted when infected urethral or vaginal
secretions contact mucosal surfaces (such as the male urethra, the
vagina, or cervix). In contrast, genital ulcer diseases (such as genital
herpes, syphilis, and chancroid) and human papillomavirus (HPV)
infection are primarily transmitted through contact with infected skin
or mucosal surfaces.
Id. Semen contains sperm which is essential for fertilization. Craig
Freudenrich & Molly Edmonds, How Human Reproduction Works,
HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, http://science.howstuffworks.comlenvironmental/life/
human-biology/human-reproduction.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
28. See Craig Freudenrich, How Sex Works, Discovery Health, http://
health.howstuffworks.com/sexual-health/sexuality/human-reproductionl.htm
(last visited Mar. 23, 2011); see also Health Healthwise Staff, Pregnancy: Baby
Development, (Harvard University, 2011), http://www.
healthwise.net/hulContent/StdDocument.aspx?DOCHWID=hwl97814#tn7392
(last visited Mar. 23, 2011)
29. Id.
30. Melissa Jeffries, In Vitro Fertilization Overview, DISCOVERY HEALTH,
http://health.howstuffworks.com/pregnancy-and-parenting/pregnancy/
fertility/in-vitro-fertilization.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
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only to stimulate egg production without the intention of
having eggs retrieved.31
In spite of the CDC's specificity, this Article will use the term
"assisted reproductive technology" in the way that it is commonly
and not medically used, to refer to all of the aforementioned
scenarios (artificial insemination, and stimulation of egg
production).32 Assisted reproductive technology does not require
the aid of a physician, although some states require physician
involvement when determining whether a sperm donor is liable
for child support.33
In in vitro fertilization, the most commonly used form of
assisted reproductive technology,34 a scientist aims to create a
viable embryo for implantation.35 This process for in vitro
fertilization involves "the joining of a woman's egg and a man's
sperm in a laboratory dish."36 However, some embryos are left
over and their disposition upon divorce creates additional legal
complexities.37 The details and relevant impacts of such assisted
reproductive technology will be addressed in the analysis of each
case or concept. 38
In addition to resulting in childbirth, both sex and assisted
reproductive technology can facilitate the transmission of
sexually transmitted diseases. For example, cases of "HIV-1
transmission through intravaginal insemination with
unprocessed donor semen" have been reported, and the CDC
warns that no procedure can remove HIV from semen.39
31. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), supra note 2.
32. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), supra note 2.
33. Presumably, it is this fact that influences certain state statutes, which
exempt men from liability, to require that semen must be provided to a licensed
physician; these are discussed infra notes 245-49. 1
34. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), supra note 2.
35. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
36. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MEDLINEPLUS MED. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007279.htm (last updated Feb.
26, 2012) ("In vitro fertilization (IVF) is the joining of a woman's egg and a
man's sperm in a laboratory dish. In vitro means 'outside the body.'
Fertilization means the sperm has attached to and entered the egg.").
37. See infra Part V.
38. See infra Parts III, V.
39. Epidemiologic Notes and Reports HIV-1 Infection and Artificial
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Nevertheless, attempts are made to screen out samples that
could be harmful under "federal regulation[s], [that require that]
all sperm must be kept in storage for at least six months while
the donor is repeatedly tested for HIV, hepatitis, and other
sexually transmitted diseases."40 Outside of the laboratory,
sexually transmitted diseases are most often transmitted in one
of two ways: through contact with "infected body fluids, such as
blood, vaginal secretions, or semen" or through contact with
"infected skin or mucous membranes."41 Some of the most
common sexually transmitted diseases in the United States are
chlamydia, HIV/AIDS, genital human papillomavirus infection
("HPV"), and genital herpes.42 Most of these common diseases
have been the subject of litigation and will resurface in the
Insemination with Processed Semen, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
249, 255-56 (1990), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
00001604.htm. For more recent and detailed information on sperm washing for
HIV-positive donors, see James D.M. Nicopoullos et al., A Decade of Sperm
Washing: Clinical Correlates of Successful Insemination Outcome, 25 HUM.
REPROD. 1869, 1876 (2010), available at http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/
content/25/8/1869.full.pdf+html.
40. SPAR, supra note 9, at 37-38. Other than this federal requirement, "[i]n
the United States, ... federal regulation is minimal, confined to a single piece of
legislation (the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992)
without any means of enforcement." Id. at 34. For more on the state regulation
of sperm banks, see Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring
Exposed Donation Is Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 379, 384
(2009):
Individual states regulate aspects of the ART process related to sperm
donation by licensing sperm banks, controlling the artificial
insemination process, and determining parent legitimacy in these
situations. Only twenty-four states have created regulatory legislation
addressing the operations of sperm banks. Some states set forth
specific requirements for artificial insemination. For example, a state
can require that artificial insemination must be performed under the
supervision of a licensed physician. Others set forth testing
requirements and require licensing and registry of all sperm banks.
Id. See also SPAR, supra note 9, at 211-12.
41. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, Sexually Transmitted
Diseases (STD): Prevent the Spread of STDs, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/dohlhtml/std/std4.shtml (last visited July 6, 2012).
42. STDs Today, NAT'L PREVENTION INFO. NETWORK, http://www.cdcnpin.
org/scripts/std/std.asp#le (last updated Oct. 16, 2012). HPV is the most common
sexually transmitted disease in the United States. See Id. for more information.
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sections of the Article, which analyze liability for the
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.43
II. SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES DUE TO SEXUAL
CONTACT44
Legal actions are successful against partners who should
have disclosed their sexually transmitted disease infection.45 In
addition to recognizing successful tort claims for the
transmission of diseases,46 some states even have statutes
criminalizing the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.47
43. See infra Parts II, III and IV.
44. This Article only analyzes civil liability resultant from the
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases. This civil/tort-based approach
does not address the transmission of an STD as evidence of criminal intent or
crime. This civil analysis aids in comparing the civil child support liability with
civil damages for the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases. For more
information on criminal liability for the transmission of sexually transmitted
diseases, see Jennifer Grishkin, Case Note, Knowingly Exposing Another to
HIV Smallwood v. State, 106 YALE L.J. 1617 (1997).
45. Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIz. L. REV.
871, 892 (2005).
46. Matthew Seth Sarelson, Toward a More Balanced Treatment of the
Negligent Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 481 (2003). In both Florida and Alabama transmitting a sexually
transmitted disease without the requisite disclosure is a misdemeanor: "Recent
additions to the list of states that permit recovery in tort for STD liability
include Alabama and Minnesota." Id. at 481 n.2. "In Florida, for example, it is a
first degree misdemeanor for any person who knows he has and can transmit
genital herpes, Chlamydia, gonorrhea, syphilis, or HIV, among other named
diseases, to other persons without informing his sexual partner of his infection
prior to intercourse." Id. at 487.
47. See id. (The majority of states require that persons infected with HIV
or other sexually transmitted diseases disclose this fact to their partners). In
addition to Alabama and Minnesota, it is a violation of criminal law to
knowingly or intentionally transmit HIV/AIDS through sex-generally without
informed consent or disclosure-in the following states: Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado (applicable only to prostitution), Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky (applicable only to prostitution), Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania
(applicable only to prostitution), South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah (applicable only to prostitution), Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin (applicable only to serious sex crimes as a factor in sentencing). See
Staff of Volume 13, State Statutes Dealing with HIV and AIDS: A
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Yet, failing to disclose the non-usage of birth control is not an
actionable offense and is not criminalized by state statutes.48
Sexually transmitted diseases such as herpes can be transmitted
with "proper condom usage,"49 just as pregnancy can occur even
with the use of a condom.50 But, state courts are more
sympathetic to the transmission of disease than unwanted
pregnancy.51 These sympathetic state courts support a "public
policy" which engages in governmental interference in order to
compensate victims of the transmission of sexually transmitted
diseases, but at the same time, these courts evoke a mantra
when confronted with the claims of contraceptive fraud victims
that believe that "as a matter of public policy the practice of birth
control, if any, engaged in by two partners in a consensual sexual
relationship is best left to the individuals involved, free from any
governmental interference."52 This result is incongruous. Even if
the courts adhere to the view that sexual activity involves risks,
both sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy are risks of
sex and therefore, both of these results should be actionable.
Thus, the state prioritizes the physical health of its citizens and
in this context and ignores their emotional and economic
health.53 While the physical health of its citizens is not a poorly
Comprehensive State-by-State Summary (2004 Edition), 13 LAw & SEXUALITY 1
(2004); HIV Criminalization: State Laws Criminalizing Conduct Based on HIV
Status, LAMBDA LEGAL, (July 12, 2010), http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/
default/files/publications/downloads/fshiv-criminalization_1.pdf [hereinafter
HIV Criminalization].
48. Oberman, supra note 45, at 891-92.
49. Sarelson, supra note 46, at 487; see also Herpes, PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/stds-hiv-safer-sex/herpes-
4271.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
50. Condoms, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/
health-topicsfbirth-control/condom-10187.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2012)
(Condoms have a two percent failure rate if they are always used correctly, and
a eighteen percent failure rate if they are not always used correctly).
51. See Oberman, supra note 45.
52. Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 429 (Ct. App. 1983) (internal
citation omitted).
53. Numerous male victims of birth control fraud have sued the women
who defrauded them claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress and
economic damage. See, e.g., Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (Ct.
App. 1980); Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *2 (Ill. App.
Ct. Feb. 22, 2005); Henson v. Sorrell, No. 02A01-9711-CV-00291, 1999 WL 5630,
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selected priority, it is possible for the state to ensure that all of
these aspects of health-emotional, economic, and physical-are
preserved.
Admittedly, if a male victim were physically damaged due to
sexual intercourse, he would likely be compensated.54 Physical
damages are more analogous to the damages that result from the
transmission of a sexually transmitted disease-sexually
transmitted diseases often result in physical damages55-thus, in
this public health context, the legal treatment of these damages
is more equal between the genders.56 As one state court admitted,
albeit in a footnote:
Both parties raise the issue of equal protection under the law.
We do not view our holding as raising that issue. A man who
suffers physical injury as a result of his female partner's
intentional misrepresentation will have the same right to seek
at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1999). For more information, see also Adrienne D.
Gross, A Man's Right to Choose: Searching for Remedies in the Face of
Unplanned Fatherhood, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 1015, 1045-46 (2007).
54. See Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 431 ("We do not think it should
insulate from liability one sexual partner who by intentionally tortious conduct
causes physical injury to the other. Public policy does not demand such
protection for the right of privacy." (internal citation omitted)).
55. Causes of action based on the transmission of sexually transmitted
diseases inherently focus on the diseases symptoms. For example, herpes
"typically appear[s] as one or more blisters on or around the genitals, rectum, or
mouth. The blisters break and leave painful sores that may take two to four
weeks to heal." Genital Herpes - CDC Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, 1 (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/std/herpesfherpes-fact-
sheet-press-sept-2012.pdf; see also Chlamydia - STD Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 1 (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/std/
chlamydia/chlamydia-fact-sheet-press-February-2012.pdf ("Even though symp-
toms of chlamydia are usually mild or absent, serious complications that cause
irreversible damage, including infertility, can occur 'silently' before a woman
ever recognizes a problem. Chlamydia also can cause discharge from the penis
of an infected man."); Gonorrhea - STD Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, 1 (June 4, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/std/gonorrhea/
gon-fact-sheet-press-june-2012.pdf ("Untreated gonorrhea can cause serious and
permanent health problems in both women and men."). HIV is well known and
causes AIDS; it is fatal. For more information on HIVIAIDS, see HIVIAIDS,
NAT'L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUs DISEASES, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/
hivaids/Pages/Default.aspx (last updated July 27, 2012).
56. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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legal redress as does appellant [victim of contraceptive fraud]
in the case at bench.57
Thus, the failure to disclose a sexually transmitted disease,
the transmission of which can result in physical damages, can
cost a defendant millions of dollars whereas failing to disclose the
non-usage of birth control results in no liability for the
defrauding party.58 Recently, in Behr v. Redmond, a defendant
was ordered to pay his sexual partner $72,000 in future medical
expenses and $1,575,600 in compensatory damages for the
negligent transmission of genital herpes.59 The California Court
of Appeal also upheld an award of $2.75 million in punitive
damages.60 In sum, it can cost over $3 million to infect someone
with herpes and nothing to render someone a parent against his
will. Litigation like this shows that the effect of the law is to
impose monetary penalties in order to deter the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases but to offer no economic penalties
to deter "unlawful" pregnancy through fraud, even though both
harms involve substantial costs.6 1 Even under a deterrence
theory, it is inconsistent to attempt to deter the spread of
diseases and not pregnancy as both occur through the same
57. Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 431 n.10 (The court engaged in
subsequent equal protection and constitutional analysis).
58. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 642 (1980)("Stephen
further alleged that as a 'proximate result' of Roni's conduct he had become
obligated to support the child financially, and had suffered "mental agony and
distress all to his general damage in the amount of $ 100,000.00. Stephen also
sought punitive damages of $100,000 against Roni for having acted 'with
oppression, fraud, and malice' towards him.") However, the Court rejected
Stephen's claims that Roni should be held liable. Id. at 641; see also Wallis v.
Smith, 22 P.3d 686 (N.M. 2001)(where the court held that "the actions asserted
here cannot be used to recoup the financial obligations of raising a child."). This
would be less than the damages received by Ms. Redmond as "[i]t now costs an
average middle-income American family $222,360 to raise a child from birth to
18." Lisa Belkin, The Cost of Raising a Child,
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/the-cost-of-raising-a-child/ (last
visited Apr. 25, 2011).
59. 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97, 116 (Ct. App. 2011). For commentary see Elie
Mystal, Lawsuit of the Day: It Only Costs $4.3 Million To Give Somebody
Herpes, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 17, 2011, 8:50 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/
2011/03/lawsuit-of-the-day-it-only-costs-4-3-million-to-give-somebody-herpes/.
60. Behr, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 115.
61. Sarelson, supra note 46, at 508.
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means-sexual contact.62 More importantly, the cases of
contraceptive fraud resulting in a childbirth, that will be
discussed herein, were cases in which sex occurred without a
condom.63 Ms. Behr, the recipient of damages from the creator of
Aussie Cosmetics, did not use a condom;64 however, a California
state court saw her as more deserving of compensation than a
man who was "duped" into not using a condom and is
consequently liable for child support. 65 Cases attempting to use
successful legal actions for the transmission of sexually
transmitted diseases as the basis for actions seeking
compensation for the birth of a child have failed because courts
distinguish the two situations.66 Courts generally rehash the
many undesired effects of sex instead of explaining the reason for
the decision,67 but one court noted that an appellant should be
compensated for her infection with herpes because the disease is
62. See supra note 40-41; Sarelson, supra note 46, at 509.
63. Usually no condom was used in these cases. See Stephen K. v. Roni L.,
164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (Ct. App. 1980); Behr, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 103; Wallis v.
Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So.
2d 1186, 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997), which are all discussed infra.
64. See Behr, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 103.
65. See Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619. "Duped" refers to the lack of
honesty in a sexual relationship where one partner represents to another that
he or she is using contraception when that is not the case.
66. Brenda Saiz, Note, Tort Law: Tort Liability when Fraudulent
Misrepresentation Regarding Birth Control Results in the Birth of a Healthy
Child-Wallis v. Smith, 32 N.M. L. REV. 549, 562 (2002).
67. In Wallis, the New Mexico Court of Appeals wrote "it is important to
distinguish the factual allegations of this case from other kinds of related
lawsuits, and thus underscore the limited reach of this opinion." 22 P.3d at 683.
The court then listed the kinds of legal actions that can result from failed
sexual relations/relationships (sexually transmitted disease, medical
complications due to pregnancy, unwanted pregnancy leading to abortion,
expense of giving birth), and then told the reader that Wallis' claim was for
"compensatory damages for the 'economic injury' of supporting a normal,
healthy child." Id. This listing followed by the statement regarding
compensation for the injury of supporting a healthy child was the full extent of
the court's distinguishing (and explanation of) the differences between Wallis'
claim and other successful legal claims. See id.
In Kathleen K. v. Robert B., the court reasoned that "there is no child involved,
and the public policy considerations with respect to parental obligations are
absent." 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 275 (Ct. App. 1984).
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"serious and (thus far) incurable."68 Conversely, child support
obligations end when a child reaches the age of majority or after
college, whereas the costs and suffering of an incurable sexually
transmitted disease will never end.69
Beyond the factual differences between the two claims, the
constitutional reasoning underlying successful transmission of
sexually transmitted diseases actions parallels that of
unsuccessful contraceptive fraud claims. In Stephen K. v. Roni L.,
a contraceptive fraud cause of action, the California Court of
Appeal "conclude[d] that as a matter of public policy the practice
of birth control, if any, engaged in by two partners in a
consensual sexual relationship is best left to the individuals
involved, free from any governmental interference."70 This
parallels the language of the Supreme Court decision,
Eistenstadt v. Baird, which held that married and unmarried
persons have the same right to contraception under the Equal
Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.71 In order to come to
this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that "[i]f the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."72 Contraception is
essential to the decision of whether to bear or beget a child in a
sexual relationship. This same contraception can be instrumental
in preventing the spread of sexually transmitted disease.73 If
individuals can decide whether to bear or beget a child by
exercising their constitutional right to contraception, and
68. Kathleen K., 198 Cal Rptr. at 276.
69. See infra Part VI.A and notes 123-130; see also Sarelson, supra note
46, at 484 n.13. For more information on HIV, see infra at note 55.
70. Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
71. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("We need not and do not,
however, decide that important question in this case because, whatever the
rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be
the same for the unmarried and the married alike.").
72. Id.
73. See supra notes 41 and 50.
250
[Volume 7CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW
diseases are transmitted the same way as children, then the two
should not be treated in a legally different manner. 74
III. SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES DUE TO
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Theoretically, assisted reproductive technology can result in
sexually transmitted diseases.75 However, searches failed to
reveal cases in which an assisted reproductive technology patient
brought legal action against a doctor or donor due to an infection
with a sexually transmitted disease. It is, however, a violation to
donate semen or eggs when one knows that he or she is infected
with HIV/AIDS or another sexually transmitted disease in the
following states: California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, North
Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia.76 Thus, if the transmission of a sexually transmitted
disease occurred through artificial reproductive technology, it
could be legally actionable.
IV. MODEL STATUTE IN THE SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
DISEASE CONTEXT
All of the model statutes proposed in this Article are based
upon the principles of uniformity, fairness, and creating remedies
for (what should be) legal wrongs. As will be explored below,
strict liability is imposed upon males for the creation of a child
through sex but not through artificial insemination.7 7 This first
model statute will impose strict liability for the transmission of a
sexually transmitted disease instead of only relying on criminal
statutes to render a victim "whole."78 While damages calculations
are difficult to standardize, since child support statutes attempt
74. See supra notes 67-68; see also Sarelson, supra note 46, at 509.
75. See infra Part III.
76. See Staff of Volume 13, Statutory Survey: State Statutes Dealing with
HIV and AIDS: A Comprehensive State-by-State Summary (2004 Edition), 13
LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 1-359 (2004); HIV Criminalization, supra note 47, at 8, 10,
12.
77. See infra Parts VI, VII, VIII.
78. See infra for a discussion of model statutes imposing strict liability.
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to provide "adequate" support for a child conceived through sex in
a sort of "strict liability," this statute will attempt to insure
adequate medical care for the victims of a sexually transmitted
disease. While this statute combines liability for incurable (e.g.,
herpes, HPV, and HIV/AIDS) and curable sexually transmitted
diseases, the itemization of diseases in the statute makes it
easier for states to determine which diseases they would like to
target for civil liability.
This proposed statute will be modeled on the Alabama Code
for the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases because the
Alabama statute is a strict liability statute and presents a brief
but comprehensive assessment of the various situations where
sexually transmitted diseases, including but not limited to HIV
(as many other state statutes do), would be transmitted.79
Alabama Code § 22-11A-21(c) states that "[a]ny person afflicted
with an STD who knowingly transmits, assumes the risk of
transmitting, or does any act which will probably or likely
transmit such disease to another person is guilty of a Class C
misdemeanor."8o
The above-cited Alabama statute is edited to automatically
provide for compensatory damages and to leave punitive
damages within the discretion of the judge or jury. This model
statute includes a provision for an affirmative defense identical
to that of a North Dakota Statute on the transmission of
HIV/AIDS:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section
that if the transfer was by sexual activity, the sexual activity
took place between consenting adults after full disclosure of the
risk of such activity and with the use of an appropriate
prophylactic device.81
79. For the text of state statutes covering the criminalization of HIV/AIDS
(and often other sexually transmitted diseases), see HIV Criminalization supra
note 47.
80. AIA. CODE § 22-11A-21(c) (2011). Chancroid, Chlamydia trachomatis,
Gonorrhea, HIV, and Syphilis are reportable sexually transmitted diseases
under the Alabama State Board of Health's regulations. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r.
420-4-1.03 (2012).
81. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17(3) (2011).
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The final statute would read as follows (edits in italics):
(a) Any person afflicted with an-ST-D a sexually transmitted
disease, defined as herpes, human papillomavirus, or HTV
[Chlamydia, gonorrhea, or syphilis may be added to the list for
jurisdictions concerned with more sexually transmitted
diseases], who knowingly transmits, assumes the risk of
transmitting, or does any act which will probably er likely
transmit actually transmits such disease to another person is
guilty ef a elass C maisdemeaner-liable to that person for
compensatory damages and additionally is liable to that person
for punitive damages if the court decides that the incident
merits such compensation. 82
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this
section that if the transfer was by sexual activity, the sexual
activity took place between consenting adults after full
disclosure of the risk of such activity and with the use of an
appropriate prophylactic device. 83
The issue of consent is ignored because this is a strict liability
statute and even if someone thought that their consent had been
vitiated, it is unlikely that they would have consented with
knowledge of the risk of sexually transmitted disease
transmission.
V. LEFTOVER EMBRYOS DUE TO ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
The right not to procreate 84 is strongly preserved when courts
are deciding the disposition of frozen embryos in the divorce
82. See supra note 80.
83. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17(3) (2011). The addition of the affirmative
defense of condom usage may preclude inclusion of the human papillomavirus
as ". . . HPV can infect areas that are not covered by a condom-so condoms
may not fully protect against HPV." Genital HPV Infection - CDC Fact Sheet,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2 (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.cdc.
gov/std/hpv/HPV-Factsheet-Press-Aug-2012.pdf.
84. See Boatman, supra note 20, at 307 ("[C]ourts generally have concluded
that the right to avoid procreation outweighs the right to biological
parenthood."); see also Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 WL
886561, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) ("Our own Tennessee Supreme
Court has stated, 'the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights
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context, even though the biological fathers, who are known sperm
donors of the embryos, obviously intended to create a child.85 The
governance of frozen embryo disposition is similar to the
governance of artificial insemination insofar as husbands are
presumed to have consented to the insemination and creation of
the embryos and the resultant legal fatherhood unless written
consent is not obtained or the father's consent is withdrawn.86
Yet, even though anonymous semen donors intended to create a
child, they are absolved from the parental responsibility imposed
on husbands and victims of birth control fraud, sexual assault,
and statutory rape. 87
A. Frozen Embryo Disposition
When deciding how to dispose of embryos upon divorce,
contracts made during the marriage are often judicially
overridden. In the case of In re Witten, the Iowa Supreme Court
framed the question of embryo disposition as a matter of "who[m]
will have decision-making authority with respect to the fertilized
eggs."88 Had these embryos been fetuses, Tamera, the wife, would
have had full control over the future of the fetus; however, the
fact that technology was used to create embryos that were not in
her body at the time of divorce inevitably changed the court's
considerations.89 Assisted reproductive technology has created a
tension between the old doctrine that focuses on a woman's
control of her own body and current technologies that do not
of equal significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation."'
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992)).
85. One law review comment phrases this in a more positive manner in the
context of a contraceptive fraud case, L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713
(N.Y. 1983), which found parental obligations for both biological parents: "This
decision, which is still good law, seems counter to the rulings in the frozen
embryo dispute cases in that it clearly does not give a parent, even one who is
deceived into becoming a parent, the right not to be one." Boatman, supra note
20, at 313.
86. See infra Part VIII and notes 249-250 for a discussion of the rebuttable
marital presumption and the written consent requirement.
87. See discussion infra Parts VI.B., C., and D.
88. 672 N.W.2d 768, 776 (Iowa 2003).
89. See id. at 772 (Tamera Witten's eggs were fertilized with the sperm of
her then husband, Trip Witten).
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require a woman's body for the creation of a child.90 A different
lower court specifically applied the reasoning of Roe v. Wadeel
and subsequent cases to embryo disposition only to be overturned
by a higher court.92
An instance where the tension between old doctrine and new
technology is clearer is the determination of the fate of minors in
the divorce context-the best interests of the child. In attempting
to decide the fate of the Witten embryos, the Iowa Supreme Court
noted that the best interests of the child standard that is
normally used in child custody decisions was "simply not
useful."93 Later in this Article, it will be shown that the best
interests of the child standard is also "simply not useful" in the
known donor insemination, sexual assault, and statutory rape
contexts.94
Even though artificial insemination statutes require
husbands' written consent to the procedure, as will be explained
later, courts have held that husbands (and former husbands) are
responsible for a child born into the marriage if it is not clear
that their consent to the procedure was withdrawn.95 Yet, a
simple "change of mind" is all that is necessary to revoke a prior
agreement regarding embryo disposition.96 For example, after
90. Beyond the inconsistencies in the treatment of various forms of
conception and results of sex and artificial insemination, there are
inconsistencies within categories, such as Artificial Insemination, Frozen
Embryos, etc. For example in Iowa, Estate of Noah Joe Storm v. Northwest Iowa
Hospital Corporation notes that "an unborn child is a 'covered person' under an
insurance policy . . . [but] a frozen embryo is not a 'child' for purposes of Iowa's
child custody laws." No. C06-4070-DEO, 2006 WL 3487620, at *3 (N.D. Iowa
Dec. 4. 2006).
91. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), rev'd, 663
N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997), aff'd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (reasoning
that, under Roe, a female participating in the IVF procedure has exclusive
decision-making authority over the fertilized eggs created).
93. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 776.
94. See infra Parts VI, VII and VIII.
95. For a discussion of the liability of husbands whose wives are artificially
inseminated, see infra Part VII.A.
96. See Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 778 ("If either partner has a change of mind
about disposition decisions made in advance, that person's current objection
would take precedence over the prior consent. If one of the partners rescinds an
advance disposition decision and the other does not, the mutual consent
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noting a change of mind, the Witten court specifically rejected the
contract and held that the two parties had to come to an
agreement themselves on the issue.97 Until then, the party who
objected to any forced procreation would have to pay for the
embryo storage costs. 98 In this manner, while the court favored
not compelling parenthood, it was careful not to order the
embryos destroyed, meaning that in Iowa, theoretically, the right
not to procreate has a cost.
However, other states have different approaches that uphold
the right not to procreate but result in a different fate for the
embryo.99 In a Texas case where the genetic material of the
embryos came from both the husband and wife of a divorcing
couple, the court upheld an original agreement which stated that
any remaining embryos be destroyed upon divorce.100 Once again,
the right of the party who did not want to procreate, in this case
the semen donor, was upheld, and in Texas, it was without any
perpetual cost. Similarly, where the woman wanted the custody
of embryos containing both her and her husband's genetic
material, the Superior Court of New Jersey's Appellate Division
affirmed a lower court order mandating the destruction of the
embryos.101 The court's reasoning was that a contract to
procreate was against public policy.102
On the other hand, victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual
assault, and statutory rape, in essence, have no control over
whether they will be parents from the moment that their sperm
joins an egg in a woman's body.103 This is the legal result of Roe
principle would not be satisfied and the previously agreed-upon disposition
decision could not be carried out.").
97. Id. at 782-83.
98. Id. at 783.
99. See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
100. Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54-55 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). For an
overview of leading cases in frozen embryo disposition, see generally Melissa
Boatman, Bringing Up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an Equitable Framework
for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes After Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 285
(2008).
101. J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 620 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
102. Id. at 619.
103. See infra note 104 summarizing Roe v. Wade.
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v. Wade and subsequent case law.104 Embryo disposition upon
divorce is one arena of the law where the usual Roe-based
biological considerations do not apply and where female
autonomy does not outweigh procreational autonomy. 105
In many states, there is no predictable answer to the
question of how to dispose of a frozen embryo. In order to become
predictable, other states should follow the lead of Florida, New
Hampshire, Texas, and Louisiana by creating a statute covering
the disposition of frozen embryos although, in light of changing
technologies, it is possible that these statutes will need to
104. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (1973). The trimester analysis in Roe was
as follows:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its
interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.
Id. For an overview of the abortion law following the Roe decision, see Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Farther reaching was Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, which reaffirmed on the merits the Court's
understanding in Roe v. Wade of the unique relationship between a
pregnant woman and the fetus she is carrying. This relationship,
Casey held, implicates so fundamental a dimension of liberty that the
choice between carrying her pregnancy to term and terminating it is
ultimately the pregnant woman's to make; only an especially weighty
countervailing interest can justify the state's displacement of the
woman by any other decisionmaker.
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1918-19 (2004).
105. The term "procreational autonomy" was used in the Tennessee case
Henson v. Sorrel: It is "composed of two rights of equal significance-the right
to procreate and the right to avoid procreation." No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212,
1998 WL 886561, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) (internal citation
omitted); see also J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 714 (N.J. 2001); Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992).
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undergo subsequent revisions.106 A statute is especially
important because judicial decisions in the reproductive sphere
106. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 177 (N.Y. 1998) ("A handful of States-
New York not among them-have adopted statutes touching on the disposition
of stored embryos."); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2011) (requiring
couples to execute a written agreement providing for disposition in the event of
death, divorce, or other unforeseen circumstances); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9:121-9:133 (2011) (clarifying that a pre-zygote is considered a "judicial person"
that must be implanted); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13-B:15, 168-B:18
(2011) (requiring couples to undergo medical exams and counseling and setting
a fourteen-day limit for maintenance of ex utero pre-zygotes). There were no
cases found where the Florida statute had been adjudicated in a manner that
would inform an observer whether these written agreements are always
enforceable. The Louisiana statute is as follows:
§ 123. Capacity
An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person until
such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or
at any other time when rights attach to an unborn child in accordance
with law.
§ 129. Destruction
A viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which
shall not be intentionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical
person or through the actions of any other such person. An in vitro
fertilized human ovum that fails to develop further over a thirty-six
hour period except when the embryo is in a state of cryopreservation,
is considered non-viable and is not considered a juridical person.
§ 130. Duties of donors
An in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which cannot
be owned by the in vitro fertilization patients who owe it a high duty
of care and prudent administration. If the in vitro fertilization
patients renounce, by notarial act, their parental rights for in utero
implantation, then the in vitro fertilized human ovum shall be
available for adoptive implantation in accordance with written
procedures of the facility where it is housed or stored. The in vitro
fertilization patients may renounce their parental rights in favor of
another married couple, but only if the other couple is willing and able
to receive the in vitro fertilized ovum. No compensation shall be paid
or received by either couple to renounce parental rights. Constructive
fulfillment of the statutory provisions for adoption in this state shall
occur when a married couple executes a notarial act of adoption of the
in vitro fertilized ovum and birth occurs.
§ 131. Judicial standard
In disputes arising between any parties regarding the in vitro
fertilized ovum, the judicial standard for resolving such disputes is to
be in the best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum.
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often mention "public policy."107 While public policy is an unclear
but legitimate reason for making a decision, the law should be
predictable,1o8 especially on an issue that is so fundamental to an
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123, 9:129-:131 (2011). In the Louisiana statute, best
interests of the child has simply been reformulated by replacing "child" with "in
vitro fertilized ovum." § 9:131. Louisiana statutes seem to be a counter-
argument to this Article's claim that procreational autonomy and the rights of
semen donors are stronger in the frozen embryo context than in other
reproductive contexts. According to Chief Judge Kaye's analysis in Kass v. Kass,
the fertilized ova have to be implanted; however, men (or women) are still able
to renounce their parental rights through Title 9, section 130. Kass, 696 N.E.2d
174. At the same time, the wording of section 130 of Title 9 of Louisiana's
Revised Statute seems to assume an intact family unit and the renunciation of
rights by the patients plural.
107. Brenda Saiz, Tort Law: Tort Liability when Fraudulent
Misrepresentation Regarding Birth Control Results in the Birth of a Healthy
Child-Wallis v. Smith, 32 N.M.L. REV. 549, 553 (2002); see also Laura W.W. v.
Peter W.W., 51 A.D.3d 211, 217 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)("Consistent with our
State's strong presumption of legitimacy, as well as the compelling public policy
of protecting children conceived via AID, we follow the lead of other
jurisdictions that impose a rebuttable presumption of consent by the husband of
a woman who conceives by AID, shifting the burden to the husband to rebut the
presumption by clear and convincing evidence (see, e.g., In re Baby Doe, 291
SC at 391, 353 SE2d at 878; K. S. v G. S., 182 NJ Super 102, 109, 440 A2d 64,
68 [1981]; People v Sorensen, 68 Cal 2d 280, 283, 437 P2d 495, 497 [1968]. But
see Jackson v Jackson, 137 Ohio App 3d 782, 795, 739 NE2d 1203, 1213 [2000]
[burden on wife to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence])."); State
ex rel. H. v. P., 90 A.D.2d 434, 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)("The court, however,
did direct the husband to submit to a blood test, inasmuch as such examination
,specifically is authorized by statute and is minimally intrusive.' We believe that
because such test has the potential to bastardize the child without settling the
issue of paternity it offends this State's public policy, which presumes the
legitimacy of children born during wedlock, and, accordingly, reverse.");
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *18 (N.Y.S. 1991) ("Since I have
found that there is a valid, ascertainable contract between the parties
obligating the husband to provide financial support for the child, the only
question which remains is whether such a contract is unenforceable as a matter
of public policy or because DRL s 73 provides the exclusive remedy for
assignment of the support obligation. The clear public policy of this state to
insure support for all children whenever possible, would appear to support
rather than invalidate the contract between the parties here."); Dunkin v.
Boskey, 82 Cal. App. 4th 171, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Brown v. Gadson, 680
S.E.2d 682, 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)
108. Predictability is a concept that is valued in law-making. See, e.g., Boys
Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 240 (1970) ("We
fully recognize that important policy considerations militate in favor of
continuity and predictability in the law."); Ray D. Henson, Law and Peace: The
Problem of Generalizations, 45 A.B.A J. 1056, 1057 (1959) ("[T]oday's law should
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individual-whether to procreate. Moreover, the statutes that do
exist are not sufficient. It is unfair to impose such familial
obligations or genetic relations after a divorce.109 It is easy to
understand how a change of mind would occur upon divorce-
during the marriage, the couple planned to have a family and a
life together, but afterwards, this was no longer a mutual desire.
This Texas statute serves as a model for other states because it
codifies the preservation of the right not to procreate until the
time of implantation that this Article will use as the foundation
of a proposed model statute.110
Introducing a theme that will be revisited throughout this
Article, non-disclosure surfaces in nearly every form of
reproduction. This non-disclosure further complicates embryo
disposition in cases where one party was unaware that there
were embryos or that assisted reproductive procedures were
(still) in use. A statute helps to address the various issues that
arise as a result of the use of assisted reproductive technology. In
addition to preserving the right to procreate, Texas' statute
provides for the disposition of frozen embryos upon divorce that
allows for decision-making prior to a divorce and a codification of
change of circumstances."n
A Texas-style statute would be especially effective in
addressing issues of marital non-disclosure. The underlying facts
of a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision on the disposition of
frozen embryos revealed that a wife had a pre-embryo (with the
genetic material of both the husband and the wife) implanted
without her husband's knowledge; he discovered the
implantation upon receipt of a notice from his insurance
company. 112 Sometime after this failed implantation, the
husband filed for divorce.113 Even though the consent forms
signed by the husband and the wife stated that in case of divorce,
the embryos would be returned to the wife for implantation, the
be predictable without imbuing it with morality.").
109. Divorce is defined as "[t]he legal dissolution of a marriage by a court."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 220 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
110. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706 (West 2011).
111. Id.
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court decided that there was a change in circumstances,114 a
recurrent theme in these cases.115 For future uses, the previous
Texas statute should be amended to prevent non-disclosure in
marital situations, by requiring the permission of both spouses
whose genetic material was being used. There should also be a
requirement of spousal notification for artificial insemination
until the marital presumption was removed.116
B. Model Statute Governing Frozen Embryo Disposition
If technology is used to create a child, there is already an
"outsider" both through the science and additional personnel
involved and because there are statutes regulating the medical
procedures and the health care providers.117 Technology is
important because it reduces the courts' concern over and dislike
of intervention in the family unit;118 technology has already
interfered with the family structure. 119 If consent is required
114. Id. at 1054.
115. Id. at 1055-56.
116. See, for example, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989),
discussed infra Part VI.A.
117. This is not referring to the ART that can occur without a physician.
118. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 645 (Ct. App. 1980)
("Courts have long recognized a right of privacy in matters relating to marriage,
family and sex."). However, it appears this privacy is reduced once a physician
is introduced into the process.
119. See Michael H., where the court held:
The conclusive presumption is actually a substantive rule of law based
upon a determination by the Legislature as a matter of overriding
social policy, that given a certain relationship between the husband
and wife, the husband is to be held responsible for the child, and that
the integrity of the family unit should not be impugned.
491 U.S. at 119-20 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "Justice Powell stated . . . 'Our decisions establish that the
Constitution protects the "sanctity of the family" precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'
Id. at 123-24 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1997)
(plurality opinion)). Although the Supreme Court views the sanctity of the
family as an important interest, once technology is added, the family is not so
insular based on the concept of tradition as assisted reproductive technology
was not so widespread in the past. Courts also recognize how complicated
technology renders the family. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
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before an initial procedure, then consent should be required for
any additional procedures. In addition, while this section
generally focuses on the storage or destruction of frozen embryos,
this consent-based framework should also apply to the possibility
of donating a former couple's embryos to another family, as this
would also violate a person's procreational autonomy.120 Thus,
this Article proposes a model statute as follows (original
additions in italics):
(a) If a marriage is dissolved before the placement of eggs,
sperm, or embryos, the former spouse is not a parent of the
resulting child unless the former spouse consented in a record,
kept by a licensed physician, that if assisted reproduction were
to occur after divorce the former spouse would be a parent of
the child.121
120. This scenario was addressed in Davis v. Davis, a Tennessee case
mentioned in A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1053, in which the Tennessee Supreme Court
ruled that the former wife's desire to donate the couple's embryos to a childless
couple did not outweigh the former husband's right to procreational autonomy.
842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992). Davis is the source of the concept of
procreational autonomy which is analyzed throughout this Article: "For the
purposes of this litigation it is sufficient to note that, whatever its ultimate
constitutional boundaries, the right of procreational autonomy is composed of
two rights of equal significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation." Id. at 601. In fact, "The Right of Procreational Autonomy" was the
title of one of the sections of the opinion. Id. at 598. In 1992, the year that Davis
was decided, the only state with a statute regarding embryo disposition was
Louisiana. Id. at 590 n.1.
121. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706(a) (West 2011). A similar statute can be
found in Washington state. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.725 (West 2007).
The Washington statute reads as follows:
(1) If a marriage ... is dissolved before placement of eggs, sperm, or
an embryo, the former spouse . . . is not a parent of the resulting child
unless the former spouse . . . consented in a signed record that if
assisted reproduction were to occur after a dissolution, the former
spouse would . . . be a parent of the child.
(2) The consent of the former spouse . . . to assisted reproduction may
be withdrawn by that individual in a record at any time before
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos.
Id. The Washington statute relied upon by a former wife in In re Marriage of
Nash, read exactly the same as subsection (1) of section 160.706 of the Texas
Family Code Annotated. See In re Marriage of Nash, No. 62553-5-1, 150 Wash.
App. 1029, at *7 (Ct. App. June 1, 2009). The Washington Appellate Division
ruled that a former wife could not keep pre-embryos that were composed of her
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(b) The consent of a former spouse to assisted reproduction
may be withdrawn by that individual in a record kept by a
licensed physician at any time before the placement of eggs,
sperm, or embryos. 122
(c) The consent of both spouses or genetic contributors must be
obtained before every placement of embryos or the genetic
material of one spouse into another.
(d) Before the disposition of any frozen embryos, the permission
of anyone whose genetic material is within the frozen embryos,
must be obtained.
(e) In the case where the two (former) spouses are genetic
contributors to a frozen embryo and both do not consent to the
disposition of the embryo, the two will split the costs of
continued storage
i. or, alternatively, based on the legislature's choice and state
populace's disposition, the words "the two will split the costs of
continued storage" could be replaced with the embryo will be
destroyed."
(f) If one spouse is the sole genetic contributor to the frozen
embryo, that spouse shall have the sole power over the frozen
embryo's fate.
Fairness dictates that the spouses split the costs of the
continued embryo storage, otherwise, a former spouse indifferent
to the fate of the embryos could use embryo storage as a way to
impose a cost upon the non-consenting spouse after their divorce.
If the two undertook the embryo creation together and the
genetic material of both of the former spouses is included, both
former spouses should be responsible for the costs of
safeguarding the embryo upon divorce. If, however, only one
person's genetic material is located in the embryos, then that
person should have the power to destroy them. This is why there
is no mention of divorce in subsection (f) as subsection (c)
former husband's sperm and a donor egg. Id. Additionally, it emphasized that
the initial donor agreement "expired six months after completion of the
retrieval procedure." Id. Due to all of these factors, the former wife was not
entitled to "any parental obligation or rights to the preembryos." Id.
122. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706(b) (West 2007).
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provides that the permission of both spouses or genetic
contributors will be obtained before implantation. Section (a) also
requires consent for separation or divorce because embryos are
not only commissioned in marriages, but also by unmarried
persons. Even though subsection (c) covers anyone whose genetic
material would be implicated, "separation" was added so as to
leave room for the statute to apply to unmarried persons,
although the term still has a marital tone. Also, the law of the
state in which the embryos were created or are currently stored
will apply. Since some states allow for the destruction of embryos
and others do not, section (e) can either require the sharing of
storage costs or the destruction of the embryo.
VI. CHILD SUPPORT LIABILITY AS A RESULT OF SEX
A. Child Support Overview
Child support is "[a] parent's legal obligation to contribute to
the economic maintenance and education of a child until the age
of majority, the child's emancipation before reaching majority, or
the child's completion of secondary education. The obligation is
enforceable both civilly and criminally."123 Every state has a child
support program for which it receives federal enforcement
funding.124 Furthermore, parents cannot, through private
contract, bargain away child support because it belongs to the
child.125 If a male and female engage in a sexual act that results
123. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 100 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
124. ACF Office of Public Affairs, Office of Child Support Enforcement Fact
Sheet, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/opa/fact-sheets/csefactsheet.html (last visited
Apr.1, 2011). For links to all state child support websites, see State and Tribal
Child Support Agency Contacts, ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/state-
and-tribal-child-support-
agency-contacts (last updated Sept. 14, 2012).
125. See, e.g., Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002), Bassett v. Saunders, 835 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002). At the same time, children's rights are sometimes minimized; see
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-32 (1989) and its rejection of
Victoria D.'s claims. However, whether these were Victoria's claims is
questionable as they were made at the very least by Victoria's guardian ad
litem. Id. It is unclear from the case if they were through the guardian ad litem.
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in a child, both parties are responsible for the child's support. 126
The word "sexual act" instead of "sex" is used because various
scenarios exist where children have been conceived without
sexual intercourse,127 but their parents are still responsible for
their support. 1 28 Additionally, the word "parent" in the previously
cited definition does not mean "biological parent," but rather,
"legal parent."129 The latter discussions of artificial insemination
revisit the concept of "paternity by estoppel" which causes people
"who promise support of a child at the time of conception by
artificial insemination" to be responsible for child support. 130
Id. Victoria was born in May 1981, and the Supreme Court decided the case in
1989. Id. at 110.
126. See Ellen London, Comment, A Critique of the Strict Liability Standard
for Determining Child Support in Cases of Male Victims of Sexual Assault and
Rape, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1957, 1958 (2004).
127. See State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1997). In Frisard,
the male alleged that the mother inseminated herself with sperm she kept from
a condom used to perform oral sex on him: "Defendant testified that plaintiff
had him wear a condom, but he denied having any knowledge of what she
planned to do with the sperm." Id. at 1035; see also Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-
2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *2 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005); Donald C. Hubin,
Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL. 29, 51 (2003); Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Fifty Years Later, 42 FAM.
L.Q. 365, 371-72 (2008).
128. Frisard, 694 So. 2d at 1040 (holding the male responsible for child
support); see Post v. Caycedo, No. 23769, 2008 WL 142449, 1, 29 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jan. 16, 2008). See generally Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas:
Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 29, 52-61
(2003); Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Fifty Years Later, 42 FAM. L.Q. 365,
371 (2008). This Article assumes sex is generally consensual; otherwise, it falls
within the ambit of the later discussion of sexual assault or statutory rape.
129. See L. v. P., 880 N.Y.S.2d 874, slip op. at 12 (Fam. Ct. 2008) (The
relevant holding was as follows: "Having weighed the testimony, character and
temperament and sincerity of the parties involved and made inquiry into and
examination of the facts and circumstances of the case and the surroundings,
conditions and capacities of the persons involved in this proceeding, and having
reflected upon the testimony and feelings expressed by the child; and having
carefully and thoroughly considered the documents submitted into evidence, this
Court finds that the Petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the best interests of the child would not be served by granting the Respondent's
application for DNA testing.").
130. Laura W. Morgan, Who's Your Daddy?: Parenthood for Purposes of
Child Support, 31 FAM. ADvOC. 36, 37 (2009). "Recent cases have applied the
theory of paternity by estoppel to heterosexual couples and same-sex partners
who promise support of a child at the time of conception by artificial
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Child support liability also comes with parental rights and
while many males do not want child support liability, many
females do not want their sperm donors to have parental rights
or obligations which would result in the donors being involved in
the women's and children's lives.31 A single parent family is
complicated enough, but the addition of an unwanted parent who
is not in a relationship with the mother creates additional
complexities in the family relationship, especially when the
unwanted parent is below the age of majority.
In addition to genetics, child support liability results from
the marital presumption. The United States Supreme Court case
Michael H. v. Gerald D. confirmed this observation.132 In that
case, Carole D. was married to Gerald D. and she had several
adulterous affairs, one of which resulted in the birth of a child
who was not related to her husband.133 The biological father,
Michael H., wanted recognition as a parent and visitation
rights.134 After several legal proceedings, the case arrived at the
Supreme Court where the majority was greatly influenced by
"tradition."135 The majority concluded that "[w]here, however,
the child is born into an extant marital family, the natural
father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique
opportunity of the husband of the marriage; and it is not
unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference to
insemination." (citing In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 2003);
Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877
(S.C. 1987)).
131. See Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 486 (Ct. App. 2005):
Our Legislature has already spoken and has afforded to unmarried
women a statutory right to bear children by artificial insemination (as
well as a right of men to donate semen) without fear of a paternity
claim, through provision of the semen to a licensed physician. The
Legislature 'has likewise provided men with a statutory vehicle for
donating semen to married and unmarried women alike without fear
of liability for child support. Subdivision (b) states only one limitation
on its application: the semen must be 'provided to a licensed
physician.'
132. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
133. Id. at 113-14.
134. Id. at 114.
135. Id. at 123-28.
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the latter."136 Scalia's majority opinion then suggested that
Michael H.'s acquisition of legal parentage was a legislative and
not a constitutional matter.137
B. Contraceptive Fraud, Sexual Assault, and Statutory Rape in
the Context of Parentage
Men who are victims of birth control fraud,138 statutory rape,
or sexual assault should not be liable for child support. "Birth
control fraud" and "contraceptive fraud" are synonymous broad
terms that encompass the keeping of sperm the donor thought
would be disposed, false allegations of contraceptive usage, and
sterility.139 In general, even if men or women are victims of
136. Id. at 129.
137. "It is a question of legislative policy and not constitutional law whether
California will allow the presumed parenthood of a couple desiring to retain a
child conceived within and born into their marriage to be rebutted." Id. at 129-
30. The model statute proposed in this Article only addresses the marital
presumption in the context of artificial insemination.
138. "Birth control fraud" is also called "contraceptive fraud," see supra note
2 and infra note 140.
139. See Gross, supra note 53; see also Philips v. Irons where it was "alleged
that the Defendant obtained sperm from the Plaintiff via oral sex and had
herself inseminated with the Plaintiffs sperm." No. 05 L 4910, 2006 WL
4472185, at *1 (Ill. Cir. April 18, 2006). Phillips went to the Illinois Appellate
District and was remanded in 2006 where the trial court found that denied the
Motion for Summary Judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim. No. 1-03-3993, 2005 WL 4694579 (Ill. App. Feb. 22, 2005),
remanded, No. 05 L 4910, 2006 WL 4472185 at *1, Apr. 18, 2006 (Ill. Cir. April
18, 2006). But, after the April 18, 2006 decision, no subsequent history of the
case exists. Without a final disposition, the case does not merit a detailed
discussion within the body of this Article.
The "keeping of sperm that one should not have" can result in "conversion"
claims as in Philips v. Irons, but this was unsuccessful: "His claims for fraud
and conversion of the sperm were dismissed, but the case was remanded on the
issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress that Phillips alleged Irons's
actions had caused him." Adrienne D. Gross, A Man's Right to Choose:
Searching for Remedies in the Face of Unplanned Fatherhood, 55 DRAKE L. REV.
1015, 1045-46 (2007).
The essence of conversion is the wrongful deprivation of one who has a right to the
immediate possession of the object unlawfully held. Plaintiff is unable to satisfy
the second element needed to state a claim for conversion. In light of the
foregoing, the third and fourth elements of conversion need not be addressed.
Phillips, 2005 WL 4694579 at *6. I am including the retention of sperm that the
donor intended to be disposed of as part of the term "contraceptive fraud"
267
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contraceptive fraud, they are liable for the consequences. 14 0
Instead of adopting a tort- or contract-based approach to these
male victims as other commentators have done, this Article
suggests that they should be treated like anonymous donors
under the artificial insemination statutes. 141 The treatment of
these victims as anonymous donors reduces the prevalence of
outdated stereotypes in law, ends civil court preemption of
criminal courts, prevents the state from tacitly sanctioning fraud
in parentage, and ends a system of transfers from victims to
various levels of government. In addition to arguing that these
victims should be treated in the same manner as anonymous
donors under artificial insemination statutes, inspired by the
reasoning of several state court decisions, this Article also
proposes a statute.
1. Contraceptive Fraud
The underlying reasons for rejecting contraceptive fraud
claims, ignoring evidentiary and legal difficulties, are often
illegitimate and based on cultural stereotypes. In order to further
understand these stereotypes, this Article presents a brief
overview of past paternity statutes before outlining how this
differs from the situation in contemporary America. This section
is then split into discussions of the specific reasons that courts
use to deny such contraceptive-fraud claims.
because some people practice oral sex as a means to avoid conception. See
Outercourse, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, www.plannedparenthood.org/health-
topics/birth-controlloutercourse-4371.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
140. See Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash
Between Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 622-23 (2009); Donald
C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 29, 51 (2003); Morgan, supra note 130; Deanna Pollard Sacks,
Intentional Sex Torts, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1076 (2008).
141. See Victoria Steinberg, A Heat of Passion Offense: Emotions and Bias
in "Trans Panic" Mitigation Claims, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 499, 510-11
(2005); see also Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and
Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 8
(2004); Oberman, supra note 45, at 902-03.
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2. Brief Legal History and Stereotypes
Child support has been present for centuries although its
foundation has evolved. For example, a perusal of an 1892-1893
Atlantic Reporter issue reveals that over 100 years ago, "[t]he
object of [child support was] to compel the defendant to
indemnify the public and the mother of the child against
expenses."142 These pre-suffrage acts protected women from the
harms of single motherhood. Similarly, and fairly, child support
statutes ensure that one person, the mother, does not have to
shoulder the entire burden of supporting a child who was
conceived by two people.
While it is true that women sacrifice more biologically,
contemporary pregnancy is a more autonomous undertaking, and
women have more control over whether to make this sacrifice.143
A New York state court decision noted that while "bastardizing"
the child used to be a worry, "the present social and demographic
situation is entirely different."144 Instead, the rise of sperm banks
and single professional mothers shows that motherhood is an
opportunity that women embrace, without waiting for men whose
support used to be deemed integral.145 In fact, "[e]specially in
urban centers such as New York, single motherhood is a common
occurrence and often a source of pride and empowerment rather
than of stigma and deprivation."146 The number of births to single
mothers has increased over the years since the late 1970s and
1980s.147 This voluntary and often independent assumption of
parenthood is unaccounted for in statutes that impose child
142. State v. Saunders, 25 A. 588, 593 (N.H. 1893).
143. Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology?: The Future of
Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 67
(2004) ("A biological father gives his sperm. A gestational mother gives: her egg
[usually], her liver, her bladder, her iron supply, her pulmonary system, her
digestive system, the elasticity of her skin and often her psychological well-
being." (citations omitted)).




147. Id. ("The last decade has shown an enormous rise in births to single
mothers.")
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support liability on men even if they did not voluntarily assume
parenthood. This Article's argument on the treatment of
contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape victims is
based on the premise that "[a] woman shouldn't be allowed to lie
about something as crucial as birth control and then hold the
father [liable] for a lifetime of child support."148 By analogy, this
reasoning is similarly applicable for sexual assault and statutory
rape victims.
It is against this backdrop of protecting women, along with
evidentiary issues, privacy concerns, and a lack of birth control
effectiveness that contraceptive fraud claims are rejected. Men
have tried to successfully litigate tort-based and contract-based
claims, but these claims have failed.149 Arguments based on equal
protection have also failed.150 The concerns of state courts that
prevent successful claims for contraceptive fraud are myriad and
mostly unreasonable. This Article summarizes these claims and
148. Sheryl McCarthy, A Couple's Deal to Use Birth Control is a Deal,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 30, 1998, at A34.
149. Gross, supra note 53, at 1019 ("Tort-based claims have been a common
route for men in these cases; however, this route seems to have led nowhere. A
few have even tried using contract law and rules of civil procedure to recover.
Another route for the deceived father to get his case heard has been through
claims arising under the Constitution. . . ."(citations omitted); see also Wallis v.
Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) ("Wallis sued Smith for money
damages, asserting four causes of action-fraud, breach of contract, conversion,
and prima facie tort-that the district court dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted."); Henson v. Sorrell, No. 02A01-9711-
CV-00291, 1999 WL 5630, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1999) (alleging breach of
contract for "express agreement to practice and be responsible for birth control
procedures. . . .").
150. Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 431 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Accordingly, we
find that Dubay has raised no viable equal protection challenge to the Michigan
Paternity Act."); see also Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 430 n.10
(Ct. App. 1983) ("Both parties raise the issue of equal protection under the law.
We do not view our holding as raising that issue. A man who suffers physical
injury as a result of his female partner's intentional misrepresentation will
have the same right to seek legal redress as does appellant in the case at bench.
Furthermore, although the different treatment of men and women must be
examined with strict scrutiny, such treatment may be justified where men and
women are not similarly situated. Since it is obvious that men and women are
not similarly situated with regard to the risk of pregnancy, any difference in
treatment of them which may be perceived in our holding is justified." (internal
citations omitted)).
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does not delve into each case individually because contraceptive
fraud cases often refer to each other.151
3. Biology
Due to the well-known case, Roe v. Wade, women have a
limited right to abortion subject to time and other constraint.152
While women have a right to abortion, courts reject the idea that
a right to disclaim fatherhood would be analogous to a woman's
abortion right because (a) men and women vary biologically and
(b) the child already exists at the time a father would attempt to
disclaim his child support obligation.153 Thus, an attempt to
equalize men and women through an analogy to the Roe
framework fails because the attempt to disclaim parental rights
occurs after the third trimester has started and ended.154 In
addition, disclaiming parental obligations is not analogous to the
regulation of frozen embryo disposition upon divorce because
these dispositions occur well before the Roe clock starts ticking. 155
At the same time, the disclaiming of fatherhood need not occur
after the child is born. Instead, a father should be able to
disclaim parenthood within the first or second trimester or upon
being notified of his unintended fatherhood. In terms of solutions,
this ability to disclaim fatherhood within the terms of the
151. For more instances of failed contraceptive fraud claims, see Stephen K.
v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1980); Beard v. Skipper, 451 N.W.2d 614
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Faske v. Bonnano, 357 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984);
L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983); Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d
623 (Pa. 1983); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
152. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973). This holding was "modified" by
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837
(1992), which altered the trimester approach into an undue burden standard.
For a greater discussion of Roe and Casey, see supra note 104 and
accompanying text.
153. See Dubay, 506 F.3d at 430; see also Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-
JV-00212, 1998 WL 886561, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) (". . . Henson's
characterization of the woman's right to abortion as stemming from 'statutory
authority' is incorrect. The differing treatment accorded men and women after
conception and during pregnancy does not stem from state law, but from the
operation of nature, i.e. biology, and from the woman's unique constitutionally
protected right to choose either childbirth or abortion.").
154. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text.
155. See Roe. 410 U.S. at 113 and 163-64.
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abortion framework is an extreme measure. As an alternative,
this Article presents the more easily codified treatment of
victimized males as anonymous sperm donors. Even though the
legal result-no parental obligations-is the same whether males
have the right to disclaim paternity within the Roe framework or
to be relieved of paternal obligations through a statute,156 in
terms of the method of obtaining the result, this method would
likely be more successful as a matter of legislative and societal
appeal because it is more targeted.
4. The Right Not to Procreate Simply Not Infringed Upon
Courts also note that a man's right not to procreate is not
infringed upon by contraceptive fraud.157 Decisions state that
male victims of contraceptive fraud still could have used
contraception58 in order to combat one of the "natural results of
consensual sexual intercourse"'ss-childbirth. Conversely, when
plaintiffs claim that their partners failed to disclose herpes,
HIV/AIDS, or other sexually transmitted diseases, the courts do
not investigate the plaintiffs' use of condoms.160 Instead, their
injuries are generally deemed actionable even though both STDs
and pregnancy are the "natural results" of sex. 161 Yet, as
mentioned before, state courts' position that physical damages
are actionable for males and females and the fact that sexually
transmitted diseases often result in physical damages,162 does not
render this argument less compelling than arguments based on
156. See supra note 104, 153-55 and accompanying text.
157. See Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620-21 (Ct. App. 1980)
("[N]o good reason appears why he himself could not have taken precautionary
measures."); Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 685 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) ("[I]f Wallis
did not desire children, he was free and able to practice contraceptive
techniques on his own."); L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 716 (N.Y.
1983) ("[Mlother's conduct in no way limited [father's] right to use
contraception.").
158. Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. 2001)
159. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
160. See supra Part II.
161. See supra notes 66-68; Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 643
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
162. See supra note 55.
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gender equality or changing social norms and outdated
foundations for the concept of child support.
5. Attempts to Escape Child Support Liability
A major reason for the rejection of contraceptive fraud claims
is that courts view these claims as attempts to reduce or "adjust[
] a natural parent's obligation to pay child support."163 But, while
the courts proffer the standard of best interests of the child, the
courts' interpretations of the best interests of the child standard
are conflated with those of the mother.164 In these conflation
cases, the court assumes that if the male is no longer parentally
responsible, then the child will not receive half of his or her
support. 65 It is not true that the child will necessarily receive
less support just because the mother has to support the child on
her own. This is because child support is an income-based
calculation, meaning that the children of wealthier parents
receive more money than those of poorer parents.166 Because
child support is not a fixed allocation of money for each child
regardless of economic situation, a parent who disregards the
procreative autonomy of another could use more of their income
to support their child than the law would usually prescribe.167
The concept of adequate child support is based on outdated
social and demographic norms, as noticed in the aforementioned
Anonymous v. Anonymous case, including dual-parent homes.168
163. Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
164. See supra note 18.
165. Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of
Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 673-75 (2008).
166. Id. at 673.
167. See, e.g., infra note 174 and accompanying text; COMMONWEALTH OF
MASS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE TRIAL CT., Bos., CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES,
available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/childsupport/guidelines.pdf.
168. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *18 (N.Y.S.
Jan. 18, 1991); Sorell v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 WL
886561 (Tenn. App. Dec. 18, 1998).
"Lastly, discriminatory classifications between genders under
state law are permissible if substantially related to achieving
an important governmental objective. Tennessee's interest in
ensuring that children receive adequate support is such an
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A dual-parent notion of adequate child support is also less
necessary in a world where all children do not receive the
support of two parents because their mothers do not want the
assistance or involvement of a father or the state.169 In addition
to no longer being the standard family structure, the nuclear
family is no longer desired by many women who intend and want
to raise a child on their own.170 Because the child support
standard may wrongly assume that mothers want or need the
support of the child's biological father, it would not be contrary to
the concept of adequate child support to mandate compensation
to male victims of contraceptive fraud; the child does not need
two parents for adequate support.
Contrary to the prevailing judicial reasoning, the mother's
situation and the child's situation should not be conflated. First,
the state does not monitor the custodial parent's spending and
therefore has no assurance that the proper percentage of support
is being spent on the child by the custodial parent unless there is
a visible defect in the child's care. Secondly, instead of having the
full support of the father, the mother could use more of her
discretionary funds on the child, as she would have to do if she
had used an anonymous sperm donor.
important governmental objective, and the imposition of
support obligations upon biological fathers, including married
or unmarried fathers, is substantially related to the
achievement of this objective. (concluding that the requirement
that all fathers pay child support, regardless of whether they
were "willing and intentional fathers," is related to the
compelling governmental interest of preserving the welfare of
children). Accordingly, any discriminatory effect is
constitutionally permissible, and Tennessee's paternity
statutes do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's right to
equal protection.
Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted).
169. See Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 786 (Ct. App. 2003)
("Meanwhile, Susan went to the same fertility clinic with the intent of
purchasing genetic material from 'two strangers who would contractually sign
away their rights' so that 'there would be no paternity case against her, ever."').
170. See generally id.
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Furthermore, the mother's money is not the child's. The best
interests of the child cannot fully and fairly be determined in a
manner where somehow all of the mother's income is imputed to
the child. While courts write "to allow one parent to utilize a
plenary action to deflect the statutory obligation onto the other
would render [the statute] nugatory," the decisions in
contraceptive fraud cases render victims' rights and fraud
statutes similarly nugatory. 171 Courts also worry that such
"claims like [a contraceptive fraud victim's], if successful, could
result in the denial of support to innocent children whom the
[child support statute] was designed to protect."172 This worry is
unnecessary for several reasons. First, the support laws no
longer support all children who reside with one parent, such as
the children of anonymous artificial insemination.173
Furthermore, due to the changed role of women in society since
child support laws were first promulgated, women no longer need
or in many cases, as noted above, no longer want the support of a
biological father. These women can more than adequately
support their children and definitely should do so when
contraceptive fraud was involved in the conception of the child.
Instead of 17% of the father's income going to the child-as
required by one state's child support guidelines-it is possible
that a court order could result in 25% of support coming from the
mother, the defrauder, and 8% coming from the father, the
victim.174 Thus, the usual percentage contribution from the
171. Douglas R. v. Suzanne M., 487 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (Spec. Term 1985).
172. Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. 1983).
173. See discussion infra Part VII and VIII of anonymous donor statutes
and the legal treatment of known donor insemination.
174. Child Support Services, OFF. OF TEMPORARY & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE,
https://www.childsupport.ny.gov/dcse/child-support_services.html (last visited
Oct. 1, 2012). In New York:
[The state] court multiplies the adjusted gross income by the
standard guideline percentage for the number of children. These
percentages are[:]
17% for one child,
25% for two children,
29% for three children,
31% for four children, and
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father would be reduced. As the crime was the proximate cause of
support, and the provisions for child support do not provide
equal, fixed support amounts for all children, forcing a criminal
mother to provide a larger percentage of the child's support
would still ensure adequate support for the child. Admittedly,
this attempt to numerically manipulate adequate support
becomes more difficult in the case of poorer mothers, but poorer
mothers receive state aid.
6. "But for" Causation Ruined by Birth Control Ineffectiveness
and Medical Privacy
Birth control imperfections ruin tort-based claims.175 Due to
the unavoidable failure rate of contraception,176 "it cannot be said
that but for the misrepresentation of contraception usage,
pregnancy would not have occurred."177 What is more shocking is
that courts use the lack of effectiveness of birth control to justify
women's fraud: "Even if Roni had regularly been taking birth
control pills, that method, though considered to be the most
reliable means of birth control, is not 100 percent effective.
Although slight, there is some statistical probability of
conception."178 While the courts are implying that there is a
causation error between one and three percent as to whether a
partner's use of contraception is effective,179 most scientific
methods and even liability standards (e.g., "preponderance of the
evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt") are imperfect.1o
at least 35% for five or more children.
A share of child care, medical, and educational expenses is added to
the percentage amount [that the noncustodial parent must pay].
Id.; see 2011 CHILD CARE IN THE STATE OF: NEW YORK, CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM.
(2011) available at http://www.naccrra.org/randd/data/docs/NY.pdf (stating that
the cost of child-care in New York per year ranges from $1,900 to $13,158).
175. See Gross, supra note 53, at 1022.
176. See Success & Failure Rates of Contraception, CTR. FOR YOUNG
WOMEN'S HEALTH, http://www.youngwomenshealth.org/summarychart.html
(last updated Nov. 3, 2009).
177. Gross, supra note 53, at 1021.
178. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal.App.3d 640, 645-46 (Ct. App. 1980).
179. See id.
180. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556, 594 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
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Someone who essentially defrauds another certainly should not
be excused from the disclosure required in the sexually
transmitted disease context simply because a child could result
from sex notwithstanding contraception.181 It is one thing to
accidentally father a child when the precautions you and your
partner agreed to failed; it is another to father a child when there
were no precautions at all because essentially, your private
contractual agreement on autonomy has been ignored which has
rendered your right to procreative autonomy irrelevant.
7. Evidentiary Issues
Even if there was a law that absolved men from support
obligations or reduced their child support obligations in cases of
contraceptive fraud, as would ideally occur, there would be
evidentiary difficulties. For example, if there was a law requiring
disclosure, then every "man could claim that his partner led him
to believe that she was taking oral contraceptives and therefore
breached her duty to disclose that she was not using
contraception."182 This is indeed possible in cases where the only
proof is statements between the two partners; however, some
female defendants admit that they defrauded the contraceptive
fraud victim.183 Beyond the evidentiary concerns, the problem is
that there is no self-help available here: "It would not be
practical for laypeople to investigate whether their partners are
taking the pill or had surgery to prevent conception. Laws
protecting patient confidentiality prohibit doctors from
responding to inquiries about contraception and fertility from a
patient's partner."184 Thus, even if a partner's declarations about
birth control cannot be proven, when female defendants admit
181. See supra notes 46 and 49 and accompanying text.
182. Oberman, supra note 45, at 918.
183. Henson v. Sorrell, No. 02A01-9711-CV-00291, 1999 WL 5630, at *1
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1999) ("Sorrell admits that she did not inform Henson
about stopping the birth control pills, and the parties did not engage in any
alternative form of birth control.").
184. Oberman, supra note 45, at 910.
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that they were taking birth control and then stopped, courts
should rule in favor of contraceptive fraud victims.185
Yet, echoing the theme of uncommon treatment, the
evidentiary issues surrounding the transmission of sexually
transmitted diseases do not impede victims' pursuit of
damages.186 Even though the plaintiff in a sexually transmitted
disease action would have the disease at issue, how would one
prevent an infected plaintiff from saying that one partner
infected him or her when it was someone else? Yet questions like
this do not affect the courts' abilities to support a cause of action
for the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease.187 This is
analogous to the proof difficulties that arise in the contraceptive
fraud context, since one cannot ask his or her partner's doctor
about their medication, fertility, or infection with sexually
transmitted diseases.188
8. Individualism and State Action
By not punishing the female perpetrators of birth control
fraud, courts implicitly deem these fraudulent activities to be
acceptable. This gives the impression that courts sanction birth
control fraud. Courts rebut this impression by noting that the
male plaintiffs could have used their own contraception.189
Hence, statements such as a "respondent's constitutional
entitlement to avoid procreation does not encompass a right to
avoid a child support obligation simply because another private
person has not fully respected his desires in this regard."190
185. Henson v. Sorrell, No. 02A01-9711-CV-00291,1999 WL 5630, at *1
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1999) ("Sorrell admits that she did not inform Henson
about stopping the birth control pills, and the parties did not engage in any
alternative form of birth control.").
186. See Sarelson, supra note 46, at 487.
187. See id. 498-500.
188. Oberman, supra note 45, at 910.
189. For a discussion, see Oberman, supra note 45, at 909-17.
190. L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 716 (N.Y. 1983). In L.
Pamela P., a contraceptive fraud victim argued that the "deliberate
misrepresentation of the mother concerning her use of contraception" served as
a defense to his child support obligation. Id. at 714. The Court rejected this
argument. Id.
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However, courts are not adamantly opposed to the protection of
legal rights that have not been protected by private actors. For
example, the Supreme Court of New Mexico found that a couple
could be compensated in tort for a failed tubal ligation that
resulted in the birth of an unplanned child.191 Tubal ligations are
a form of contraception, and here a private actor did not respect
this woman's entitlement to avoid procreation.192 While this
action differs from "other" contraceptive fraud cases because this
is not a case between a provider of semen and a woman, under
state court reasoning, this is still an attempt to avoid child
support liability. Even though the married couple here is not
requesting to be relieved of their child support obligation, they
are requesting damages, just as male victims of contraceptive
fraud have done.193 Yet, the New Mexico court did not deem this
to be an attempt to avoid one's parental obligation.194 Instead,
the court held:
[T]hat the Mendezes' interest in the financial security of their
family was a legally protected interest which was invaded by
Lovelace's negligent failure properly to perform Maria's
sterilization operation (if proved at trial), and that this
invasion was an injury entitling them to recover damages in
the form of the reasonable expenses to raise Joseph to
majority.195
191. Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 612 (N.M. 1991).
192. "A tubal ligation-also known as having your tubes tied or tubal
sterilization-is a type of permanent birth control. During a tubal ligation, the
fallopian tubes are cut or blocked to permanently prevent pregnancy. A tubal
ligation disrupts the movement of the egg to the uterus for fertilization and
blocks sperm from traveling up the fallopian tubes to the egg." Tubal Ligation:
Definition, MAYO CLINIC http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/tubal-ligation/
MY01000 (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
193. See supra Part VI.B.
194. Mendez, 805 P.2d at 612.
195. Id. (The New Mexico Supreme Court found the calculation of damages
to be a difficult activity and remanded the case for these calculations along with
the adjudication of other procedural issues). Other states have also recognized
such a cause of action.; see Provencio v. Wenrich, 261 P.3d 1089, 1092 (N.M.
2011) ("New Mexico, California, Oregon, and Wisconsin . . . permit full recovery
for child-rearing costs without a potential offset to the doctor.").
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There is a lack of uniformity in the law here because just as
birth control and condoms are not 100% effective, obviously
sterilization is not either. However, if a private actor who fails to
recognize a person's right to procreate is a physician-the same
person who would write a hormonal birth control prescription-
then a court will find a cognizable claim for damages. A
contraceptive defrauder should not be exempt from breaking the
law just because she is a mother and not a physician. But this is
exactly what courts do when they find that a physician's
disrespect for a person's preferred contraception bars a claim for
the damages. California courts, for example, regard the factual
circumstances underlying a "defrauded" plaintiffs claims as an
"otherwise entirely private matter" for which the state "has
minimal if any interest."196 However, courts should be interested
in any private matters with such broad public implications,
whether they are muggings, Ponzi schemes, or the loss of over
17% of one's income for eighteen to twenty-one years due to
contraceptive fraud.
C. Sexual Assault
In S.F. v. ex rel. T.M., an Alabama case in which a woman
had nonconsensual sex with an intoxicated, unconscious man
several times resulting in the birth of a child.197 First, the
unconscious man was held liable for child support. 198 The fact
that this man was held liable for the results of a rape should
merit outrage-both judicial and social. Had this been a woman,
there would be no question that this was a terrible violation of
autonomy and physical well-being. Second, this male rape victim
pled to the courts for equitable treatment: "He further contended
that the court, acting in equity, could abate any child support
payments due because of what he alleged to be T.M.'s sexual
assault upon him."199 Equity is supposed to result in fairness, but
discussions in the contraceptive fraud, paternity by estoppel, and
196. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 643 (Ct. App. 1980).
197. 695 So. 2d 1186 at 1187, 1191 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
198. Id. at 1187.
199. Id.
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artificial insemination contexts reveal that equity is generally
only used to impose parental obligations, not to remove them.200
Equity is one-sided in family law when it is applied to parental
obligations. Equity is already a subjective concept and its
inability to help victims of sexual crimes should alarm not only
proponents of victims' rights but also legislators. The legal
system should not support the further victimization of sexual
assault victims by forcing them to be legally responsible for the
results of an illegal act.
Voluntary action should be required for parenthood.201 S.F.,
the victim in the Alabama sexual assault case, argued that
Alabama's artificial insemination statute required voluntary
action by the biological father in order to impose the rights and
obligations of parenthood.202 Procedurally, however, he did not
raise this issue in the trial court, so it was not considered on
appeal.203 Even though we do not know how the courts would
have ruled on this issue, this Article proposes a model statute
that reduces the reliance of these sexual assault victims on
(unreliable) equity for a legal result, which would respect the
trauma that they have experienced. This model statute will seek
to achieve the same results for sexual assault victims as the law
creates through artificial insemination statutes for anonymous
donors. Using the artificial insemination statutes for anonymous
donors as a guide avoids judicial consideration of a major
obstacle facing male assault victims-the best interests of the
child standard.204 Statutes that allow anonymous donors to
escape parental obligations and rights inherently reject current
200. Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 611 (Fam. Ct. 1982) ("Equity
has long lamented that the law cannot remedy all ills. Recognition of the limits
of effective legal action does not mean that the law approves conduct deemed
beyond its reach.").
201. See S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Ga. 1997); see also
Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of
Statutory Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from Their
Victimization?, 36 GA. L. REV. 411, 418 (2002); see infra Part VI.D.
202. S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1188.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1189 ("[T]he interests of the child are our paramount concern and
take precedent over the interests of the other parties involved.").
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state judiciary interpretations of the best interests of the child
standard as discussed earlier.205
The claims of sexual assault victims are more compelling
than the "usual" contraceptive fraud victims both inherently and
"evidentiarily." In S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., a friend of the male
victim,
testified that approximately two months later he had had a
conversation with T.M. in which she told him that she had had
sex with S.F. while he was passed out and that it had 'saved
her a trip to the sperm bank.' S.F. presented testimony from
two other witnesses who testified that they had heard T.M.
brag about having sex with S.F. while he was passed out.206
It is clear from the testimony that S.F. did not consent to the sex
that "saved [T.M.] a trip to the sperm bank."207 T.M. assaulted a
man in order to obtain something that could be legally and
commercially obtained.208 And under a standard of best interests
of the child, where the mother's economic well-being is conflated
with the child's, she surely should not be able to profit from this
assault through child support payments.
In S.F., the court "note[d] that the father could have filed
criminal charges against the mother."209 However, criminal
charges cannot compensate or render financially whole the male
assault victim who still has the obligation to support an
unwanted child until at least the age of majority.210 Also, it is
possible that these criminal proceedings would not even be
within the ambit of the often-present best interests of the child
standard. The law seems to put a preference on dual-parent
families or at least support from two parents, but it would not be
in the best interest of the child to have one parent in jail.211
205. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
206. S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1188.
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
209. S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1189.
210. See supra note 123 and accompanying text for definition of child
support.
211. See, e.g., S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1189 ("[The] father's recourse under the
law as to the mother of the child in this matter, was to file criminal charges
against her. To penalize this child for the mother's actions would run contrary
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Under the logic employed by courts, where the best interests of
the child are conflated with the mother's, the result would be
that the custodial mother could not even go to jail. Of course, this
is not to argue that mothers should be free from jail terms due to
the best interests of the child, but only to show how the best
interests of the child standard cannot actually reign supreme.
Furthermore, "a biological father who fails to pay child support to
his child's mother faces the possibility of incarceration, which is
perhaps the ultimate deprivation of liberty."212 If a father can
face jail for non-payment of child support, then financial liability
for what should be a crime pales in comparison.
D. Statutory Rape
If underage victims cannot even consent to sex, they should
not be able to consent to parenthood.213 Instead, currently,
underage victims' inability to consent for criminal purposes leads
to civil liability, even though there are two children's best
interests to consider when statutory rape occurs. 214 As a general
matter, courts deem children to be a class deserving of more legal
protection, which is why children's best interests can outweigh
the best interests of adults. But, the best interests of a newborn
should not outweigh the best interests of a child rape victim; the
line drawing is arbitrary, as both the biological father and the
newborn are children.
to the fundamental purpose of this proceeding as established by statutory and
case law. This Court is not concerned with the child's mother's actions but
rather protecting the best interests of and insuring that adequate provision will
be made for, the child's needs.").
212. Christopher Bruno, Note, A Right to Decide Not to Be a Legal Father:
Gonzales v. Carhart and the Acceptance of Emotional Harm as a
Constitutionally Protected Interest, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 141, 159 (2008)
(footnote omitted).
213. E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity:
Evidence of the Biological Mother's Consent to the Biological Father's Co-
parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 116 (2006) ("The theory behind
statutory rape is that a minor cannot legally consent to sex because of [his or]
her young age. Among the important purposes of statutory rape laws is the
prevention of teenage pregnancy." (footnote omitted)).
214. See supra note 210.
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Treating statutory rape victims in the same manner as
anonymous donors in artificial insemination statutes ends the
second-guessing of criminal decisions by family court judges. This
uniform treatment also reduces the inconsistent application of
the best interests of the child standard.215 Through statutes
absolving anonymous donors of legal liability, states ignore the
existence of an additional biological father who could pay support
and who obviously donated his semen to create a child.216 A
statutory rape victim did not intend to create a child and could
not criminally consent to the act that resulted in the birth of the
child, and therefore, the victim should not be liable for a child
support obligation.217 Other commentators have noticed that the
era's social norms affected the creation of statutory rape laws-
similar to those on child support-"[s]pecifically, statutory rape
laws are being enforced according to cultural stereotypes of
women as sexual victims and men as sexual aggressors."218
These stereotypes reduce sympathy for male victims and lead
to judicial decisions that include statements, such as "[t]he law
should not except Nathaniel J. from this responsibility because
he is not an innocent victim of Jones's criminal acts. After
discussing the matter, he and Jones decided to have sexual
relations. They had sexual intercourse approximately five times
over a two week period."219 Nathaniel J.'s "decision" to have sex
with a thirty-four year old woman, an activity that he could not
legally consent to, in no way renders him any less of a victim of a
215. See infra notes 210, 216-218 and accompanying text.
216. Baker, supra note 141, at 10 ("Most states have statutes divesting a
man who voluntarily sells or donates his sperm of all parental rights and
obligations, as long as the insemination using his sperm is performed by a
licensed medical professional.").
217. For more information on statutory rape victims, see Jones, supra note
201, at 412-13. For decisions, see County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57
Cal Rptr. 2d 843 (Ct. App. 1996) and infra notes 220-41 and accompanying text.
218. Jones, supra note 201, at 412; see London, supra note 126, at 1974-75
("Ruth Jones explains that statutory rape laws were drafted-and are
enforced-in light of the female experience . . . [and] Jones analyzes the failings
of the strict liability in the context of equality, primarily arguing that 'while
young men and young women are dissimilar in their ability to become pregnant,
they are similar in their need for protection by statutory rape laws."').
219. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845 (emphasis added).
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crime. First, Nathaniel J. could not legally consent to the act, and
second, had he been a female victim of statutory rape, it is
doubtful that a court would say she was not an "innocent victim."
And if a civil court would deem any sort of statutory rape victim
not to be an innocent victim, regardless of the victim's gender,
this pronouncement chips at a core principle of the American
justice system-due process.220 There is no record of this judge
examining all of the evidence of this case and relying upon expert
testimony so as to determine this victim's mental state.221 If
anonymous donors do not have support liability then neither
should victims of statutory rape, and judges should not be able to
undermine criminal statutory rape laws.
Similarly, the same conflation of the child's and the mother's
financial situation arises in the statutory rape context. In
determining that a statutory rape victim was liable for child
support, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin wrote, "[e]ven
assuming that L.H. criminally assaulted appellant, child support
is paid to benefit the child, not the custodial parent. The
custodial parent receives support payments in trust to be used
for the child's welfare."222 This statement on the idea underlying
the distribution of child support from mothers to children reveals
a flaw of child support in fraud and assault cases: the state is
trusting a woman, who defrauded or criminally assaulted
someone and then subsequently insisted upon obtaining support
from that victim, with trusteeship over a minor's care. If the
state wanted to ensure that the children actually received this
220. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) ("[I]t is a guarantee of
fair procedure, sometimes referred to as 'procedural due process'. . . .").
221. See Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
222. In re Paternity of J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing Francken v. State, 209 N.W. 766, 772 (Wis. 1926)). In re Paternity of
J.L.H. and its reasoning of child support being "in trust" was also used in a
Court of Appeals of Minnesota case. See Jevning v. Cichos, 499 N.W.2d 515, 517
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993). But see Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350, 354
(Civ. Ct. 1982) (While upholding a woman's recovery for an abortion, the Court
wrote "[w]hile it is true that the alternative methods of birth control which the
claimant would have used had she not relied upon the defendant's
misrepresentation are not one hundred percent effective, these methods are far
superior to sexual intercourse without the use of any contraception. Therefore
the remote chance the pregnancy might have resulted in any event is not
sufficient to deny the claimant recovery.").
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money, perhaps the state should actually create a trust, where a
criminal mother is not the primary person responsible for outlays
of support money.
1. Transfers
Statutory rape victims should not be forced to participate in a
system of transfers from victims to various levels of government.
As has been alluded to earlier in the Article, poorer women who
do not have dual incomes to provide all of the necessary support
to their families have governmental aid through welfare
programs to support them.223 This governmental aid imposes
additional burdens on crime victims and additional tacit state
support for the further victimization of statutory rape victims.224
For example, Nathaniel J., already a victim of a crime, was sued
by the San Luis Obispo County District Attorney's office for child
support and welfare reimbursement.225 Even though, under
current statutes, as a biological father, Nathaniel J. would be
required to support his child, Nathaniel J. argued "exacting child
support from a victim of statutory rape violates public policy."226
His claim was rejected.227 In effect, the state's message was that
Nathaniel J. was indeed a victim, but his needs did not come
before the needs of the state or the child he unwillingly
fathered.228 Similarly, the state in some ways sympathized with
223. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 201, at 411, 449-50.
224. Id. at 456-57.
225. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844.
226. Id. Nathaniel J. also argued that a California constitutional provision
providing that 'all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity
shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for
losses they suffer"' applied to him. Id. at 844 (quoting CAL. CONST., art. I, §
28(b)). This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal in favor of California
child support law. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 844-45. Some courts focus their analysis on the rights of the
newborn child to bring an action. See, e.g., Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223,
227 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) ("The UPA, however, gives the child the right to
bring an action for back support, and requires that the child be made a party to
the paternity and child support action when instituted by the natural mother."
(citing Nettles v. Beckley, 648 P.2d 508 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982))). However, this
rationale does not ruin this Article's argument because children are still not
allowed to institute these actions against their anonymous sperm donor fathers.
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Nathaniel J.'s position by not enforcing a child support order
until Nathaniel J. was an adult who would be able to pay the
support obligation.229 Nevertheless, Nathaniel J.'s child support
obligation was simply postponed; it continued to accrue through
the age of eighteen and beyond. This Article's model statute
would completely eliminate liability for children like Nathaniel J.
Outside of California, many other states hold statutory rape
victims liable for child support. In Minnesota, the county and a
female statutory rapist sued the child victim and won, forcing the
victim to pay child support.230 Also, in Kansas, a lower court
required a statutory rape victim to reimburse the Department of
Social and Rehabilitation $7,000; the state continued the
argument that a child's age has nothing to do with the question
of biological fatherhood.231 If the purpose of statutory rape laws is
to protect children from being exploited by adults, there is a flaw
in this application and the system of transfers shows that the
laws are failing to meet this purpose.232 Instead of protecting
statutory rape victims, these decisions forcing statutory rape
victims to be liable for child support and to reimburse various
levels of government only serve to continue exploiting the victims
long after the crime was committed.
229. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846 (quoting District Attorney's
statement at July 19, 1995: "[O]ur office is seeking to establish paternity. We
are not seeking a child support order . . . until such time as the minor becomes
an adult and is able to pay support." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
230. Jevning v. Cichos, 499 N.W.2d 515, 518 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
231. State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Kan. 1993)
("When questioned in oral argument about the policy of SRS in seeking a
judgment in excess of $7,000, counsel replied with the surprising statement
that SRS had no intention of ever attempting to collect its judgment. Under
such circumstances, the reason for seeking that portion of the judgment still
eludes us.")
232. See Jones, supra note 201, at 411, 449-50; cf. Robert L. Franklin,
Sexual Coercion and Sexual Exploitation of Minor Teens (Statutory Rape):
Curriculum Module for Youth Service Providers, VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH CTR. FOR
INJURY & VIOLENCE PREVENTION, available at http://www.vahealth.org/
varapelaws/Youth%20Service%20Curriculum2.pdf (explaining exploitation in
statutory rape).
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2. Treatment of Female Statutory Rape Victims as Precedent for
the Elimination of Support Obligations
In DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary L., a female incest victim was
excused from child support liability, which provides a basis for an
excusal of statutory rape victims from child support liability.233
In that case, the Delaware code included a provision stating that
"[n]o person shall be required to support another while he has
just cause for failing or refusing to do so,"234 and the Delaware
court decided that rape or incest qualified as "just cause."235
However, even if other states do not have a statutory provision
providing for child support exceptions, a just cause exception
permits another avenue for state courts to have discretionary
authority in order to impose principles of equity.236 This would be
a progressive initial step. The family court judge then
distinguished this case from other cases involving male statutory
rape victims such as State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer,237 by
stating that the courts in other cases did not inquire into
whether the statutory rape was voluntary.238 The court then
stated the following rule:
To the contrary, in each of the cases, the respective Court
appeared to infer from the factual assertions that the sexual
intercourse was voluntary. Where voluntary intercourse
results in parenthood, then for purposes of child support, the
233. No. 38812, 1994 WL 811732 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 3, 1994).
234. Id. at *2 (quoting DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 506 (1994)).
235. Id. at *3. For a discussion of this case, see Jones, supra note 201, at
417-18.
236. Jones, supra note 201, at 447 ('VMost child support laws have a general
exemption that permits courts to exclude some parents from child support
obligations in the interest of justice. However, given the difficulty in actually
recovering support for children, courts have been extremely reluctant to excuse
parents from their child support obligations. Typically, states have only
permitted an exception for child support enforcement in circumstances where
the parent lacks the ability to pay or when pursuit of support could endanger
the mother, such as when the mother has been the victim of forcible rape or
domestic violence." (citations omitted)).
237. 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993).
238. DCSE/Esther, 1994 WL 811732, at *3.
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parenthood is voluntary. A parent's duty to support the child
flows directly from his voluntary parenthood. 239
As a result, the case was remanded in order to determine
whether actual consent-not legal consent-was present. 240
While this seems to be an inferior alternative, it seems that had
the other state courts truly inquired into whether this
intercourse was voluntary, it is possible that some statutory rape
victims could be saved from the unfair imposition of child support
liability.
If legislatures want to pursue the alternative of judicial
determination of victims' innocence and mental capacity to
consent, these courts could conduct evidentiary hearings with
psychiatrists, medical experts, and witnesses. This alternative is
not preferable because statutory rape victims cannot consent to
parenthood when there is a statute stating that the child cannot
consent to the sexual act that would result in parenthood.
However, if this alternative were codified, this statute would
address the lack of process that arises when civil court judges
decide if children were innocent victims. Furthermore, victims in
states without unreasonably proactive judges may be able to take
advantage of codified equity. With the alternative approach,
perhaps a few statutory rape victims would be excused from
liability if courts determined that they were indeed exploited.241
E. Model Statute Addressing Involuntary Reproduction
The Texas artificial insemination statute is adapted here so
as to legally mandate that the treatment of contraceptive fraud
victims, statutory rape victims, and sexual assault victims be the
same as that of anonymous sperm donors. Simply and concisely,
Texas code provides that "[a] donor is not a parent of a child
conceived by means of assisted reproduction."242 For states that
239. Id; see also Seyer, 847 P.2d at 1278 (concluding that consent to sexual
activity is irrelevant when making determinations regarding the payment of
child support).
240. DCSE/Esther, 1994 WL 811732, at *3.
241. For more on exploitation, see Franklin, supra note 232.
242. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (West 2011).
289
2012-20131 Sex and Statutory Uniformity
refuse to create a new statute for statutory rape victims, a just
cause exception could be added to the child support statute.
Otherwise, states should adopt the following edited Texas
artificial insemination statute (edits in italics):
(a) A doner male is not a parent of a child conceived by
means of essited involuntary reproduction.243
(b) "Involuntary" reproduction means any action
(i) That would be classified as statutory rape meaning
that any pleadings to lesser charges do not affect the
applicability of this statute
(ii) In which a female mother states that she is using
hormonal contraception and in reliance, the male has
unprotected sex with her
(iii) That would be classified as a sexual assault under
criminal code
(c) As a result of this lack of parenthood, males covered under
section (b) will not have parental obligations and will be
treated as anonymous donors.
This Article limits section (b)(ii) only to hormonal birth
control fraud due to the low probability that it would fail if used
properly, as compared to other methods of contraception; the goal
of the statute is to compensate those who were duped into using
no contraception, not those whose contraception failed.244
VII. CHILD SUPPORT LIABILITY FOR ANONYMOUS
DONATION OF SPERM
Anonymous sperm donors are generally statutorily absolved
of the duty to support the children that they genetically father,
243. Id.
244. See supra note 58 for a discussion of Stephen K. See also Comparing
Effectiveness of Birth Control Methods, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.
plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/birth-control/birth-control-effectiveness-
chart-22710.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). The following result in 2 to 9
pregnancies out of 100 per year: Shot (Depo-Provera), Pill, Ring, Patch. Id.
These methods would be acceptable under the model statute. The following
result in 15 to 24 pregnancies out of 100 per year and are not acceptable
methods of contraception under the model statute: Male Condom, Diaphram,
Female Condom, Cervical Cap, Sponge, Fertility-Awareness Based Methods. Id.
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even though they obviously intended the samples to result in a
child.245 In contrast, equity is used to impose liability on
husbands whose statutorily required written consent or other
requirements were not fulfilled, although the child is not related
to the husband.246 Artificial insemination statutes vary from
state to state.247 Most states have artificial insemination
statutes, although some, like Maine, do not.2 4 8 "The majority of
states . . . have enacted statutes concerning artificial
insemination [that] state that the husband of a married woman
bears all rights and obligations of paternity as to any child
conceived by artificial insemination, whether the sperm used was
his own or a donor's."249 Statutory requirements are often ignored
245. See Baker, supra note 141, at 10 ("Most states have statutes divesting
a man who voluntarily sells or donates his sperm of all parental rights and
obligations, as long as the insemination using his sperm is performed by a
licensed medical professional.").
246. See Laura WW. v. Peter WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d 258, 262 (App. Div. 2008)
("Certainly, situations will arise where not all of these statutory conditions are
present, yet equity and reason require a finding that an individual who
participated in and consented to a procedure intentionally designed to bring a
child into the world can be deemed the legal parent of the resulting child [such
as in a case similar to one that] 'not[ed] the statute does not provide a result
where AID [artificial insemination donation] is performed by someone other
than a 'duly authorized' 'physician,' but that status of the medical professional
should not impact the legitimacy of child").
247. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Jan. 18, 1991).
248. See In re Guardianship of I.H., 834 A.2d 922, 924 (Me. 2003) ("Maine
has neither statutes nor case law regarding anonymous sperm donors.").
249. In the Interest of K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1033-4 (Kan. 2007):
The majority of states that have enacted statutes concerning
artificial insemination state that the husband of a married woman
bears all rights and obligations of paternity as to any child conceived
by artificial insemination, whether the sperm used was his own or a
donor's. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(a) (1992) ("If, under the
supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a
man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the
natural father of a child thereby conceived."); see also CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7613(a) (West 2004) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(1) (West
2005) (same); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 750 40/3(a) (West 1999) (same);
MINN. STATE § 257.56 Subd. 1 (2007); Mo. REV. STAT. 210.824(1) (2000)
(same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(1) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. §
126.061(1) (2005) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(a) (2002) (same);
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in this arena due to equity and a "rebuttable marital
presumption."250 Because equity is one-sided in the anonymous
sperm donation and contraceptive fraud contexts, although
statutes relieve anonymous sperm donors of support obligations,
this Article argues that these statutes should be amended so as
to apply to discernible victims of contraceptive fraud, statutory
rape, and sexual assault, as evidenced in the model statute.
A. Liability for Husbands Whose Wives are Artificially
Inseminated by Anonymous Donors
While the men who anonymously donate sperm are generally
not responsible for parental support, husbands whose wives are
inseminated with these anonymous sperm samples are required
to support the child, even if statutory writing requirements were
not followed.251 Ignoring these writing requirements leads to
inconsistency in the treatment of semen in the law of
reproduction and disease transmission and also in the
interpretation of statutory law. The writing requirements are not
always ignored, such as in a New York divorce action where the
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6(A) (Michie 2006) (same); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3111.95(A) (Anderson 2003) (similar); WIs. STAT. § 891.40(1)
(2005-06) (same). Further, several of these states' statutes provide
that a donor of semen used to inseminate a married woman will not be
treated in law as the father of any child conceived, if he is not the
woman's husband. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(b) (1992) ("The
donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived."); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 Subd. 2 (2007) (same); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 210.824(2) (2000) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2)
(2005) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061(2) (2005) (same). One court
has observed that these two rules protect the expectations of the
married couple, the best interests of the child, and the expectations of
the donor. See People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 284-88, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495 (1968).
250. Laura WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d at 263. "Consistent with our State's strong
presumption of legitimacy, as well as the compelling public policy of protecting
children conceived via AID, we follow the lead of other jurisdictions that impose
a rebuttable presumption of consent by the husband of a woman who conceives
by AID, shifting the burden to the husband to rebut the presumption by clear
and convincing evidence." Id. (internal citations omitted).
251. Baker, supra note 141, at 10.
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court ruled that since the husband's consent to the artificial
insemination was not obtained in writing, he was not liable for
the care of the child under the statute.252 But even after such
statutorily accurate decisions, the New York court noted that,
[c]ertainly, situations will arise where not all of these statutory
conditions are present, yet equity and reason require a finding that an
individual who participated in and consented to a procedure intentionally
designed to bring a child into the world can be deemed the legal parent
of the resulting child. 253
This statement alludes to the many inconsistencies in the
treatment of sperm in the assisted reproduction context. Equity
can be used to override a statute which reduces the predictability
of the law. The overriding of a statute by equity also gives rise to
the query of why equity can impose liability on an unrelated
parent whose child was created through artificial insemination
but not relieve a statutory or adult rape victim of liability. The
omnipresent best interests of the child standard arises here, and
the previously mentioned New York court noted that "the best
interests of children and society are served by recognizing that
parental responsibility may be imposed based on conduct
evincing actual consent to the artificial insemination
procedure."254 New York and other states have created a
"rebuttable presumption of consent by the husband of a woman
who conceives by AID, shifting the burden to the husband to
rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence."255
Courts justify this presumption not only with equity but with
252. Laura WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d at 261, 263; see also Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753 at *19 (NY Sup. Jan. 18, 1991) (The husband's
stipulation not to support the child is specifically mentioned not only because it
was a part of the facts of the case but also because in another New York case, a
husband stipulated in a divorce decree to support a child and then contested the
imposition of liability. His arguments were rejected because he had previously
consented to supporting the child.).
253. Laura WW, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 262 (citing Letter from Div. of Human Rights,
Bill Jacket, L. 1974, ch. 303, at 9 ("noting the statute does not provide a result where AID is
performed by someone other than a "'duly authorized" physician,' but that status of the
medical professional should not impact legitimacy of child")).
254. Id. at 262-63 (quoting In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill.
2003)).
255. Id. at 263; see supra note 250.
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"evidence that medical personnel who conduct AID [artificial
insemination donation] procedures are not always aware of
statutory consent requirements."256 This goes beyond the often-
quoted criminal doctrine "ignorance of the law is no excuse" and
imposes someone else's ignorance, the medical professional's,
onto the unwilling husband. It is for this reason that this
Article's model statute will not allow for rebuttable presumptions
of consent because it is unfair to place someone's future
obligations in the hands of an unrelated third-party. A physician
should give the husband who attends his wife's artificial
insemination a form that states that he will be liable for these
inseminations if he continues to attend or explicitly consent to
them. To surprise him with child support later is unfair.
Similarly, it seems that the evidentiary concerns of birth
control fraud cases should re-enter in anonymous insemination
cases. Even with a rebuttable presumption in birth control fraud
cases, courts cite the lack of proof that a statement was ever
made regarding contraceptive use as a reason for the rejection of
the defendants' claims.257 The facts of one case found that where
it was undisputed that the husband was aware that his wife was
using artificial insemination in order to get pregnant and he
never informed her that he would not accept such a child as his
own, the husband was liable.258 However, when awareness of the
wife's undertaking of artificial insemination is disputed or the
husband alleges that he said he would not accept such a child as
his own, evidentiary issues re-arise. Courts should avoid trying
to determine oral representations or intentions of those involved
in a failing marriage without proof. If courts accept oral
representations, then the legislature should codify the sufficiency
of oral representations, if that is desired, and require third party
witnesses, preferably an unrelated third party.259 In this way,
256. Laura WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
257. See, e.g., Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. 1983).
258. See Laura WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
259. Such a solution would still allow for the situation presented in R.S. v.
R.S. in which the overturning of the statute is less blatant and where equity
and estoppel appear to be more warranted:
[A]nd a husband who with his wife orally consents to the treating
physician that his wife be heterologously inseminated for the purpose
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evidentiary issues surrounding artificial insemination are
slightly less insurmountable than those associated with
contraceptive fraud as it is more likely that there are third party
witnesses when technology is involved in conception.
Fraud also reappears in the marital artificial insemination
context, 260 and for this reason, equitable principles should either
be codified or inapplicable. In one case where the wife
inseminated herself without the husband's consent but led her
husband to believe that the child was "conceived naturally,"261
the husband was held blameless and did not have to support the
child, thus, eliminating the marital presumption.262 In that case,
however, the husband moved out of the marital residence nearly
a year later.263 This Article's frozen embryo and artificial
insemination statutes attempt to prevent such cases of non-
disclosure.264 If anonymous sperm donors have a right of
procreational autonomy, then those whose statutorily required
consent was not obtained should also not be forced to provide
financial support for a child.
VIII. CHILD SUPPORT LIABILITY FOR KNOWN SPERM
DONORS
While anonymous donors receive legal protection. against
child support liability,265 if a known donor and a mother agree in
a contract to relieve the man of child support or parental
liability, it is generally deemed void, even though providing
sperm to a sperm bank or an acquaintance are both private
actions.266 It is unfair to treat anonymous sperm donors any
of producing a child of their own is estopped to deny that he is the
father of the child, and he has impliedly agreed to support the child
and act as its father.
670 P.2d 923, 928 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983).
260. Wells v. Wells, 35 So. 3d 1250, 1253-54 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1257.
263. Id. at 1254.
264. See infra Part VIII.C.
265. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
266. See Bassett v. Saunders, 835 So. 2d 1198-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
("Although the mother refers to this agreement as a 'sperm donor' agreement,
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differently from known sperm donors, but courts worry that it is
just as easy to allege that one presented sperm for donation when
sexual intercourse was the cause of a pregnancy, just as an
alleged birth control fraud victim could state that the mother
made indeterminable representations.267
A. Overview of State Statutes
While equity changes statutory requirements when it comes
to male parental responsibility for a child created through
artificial insemination during a marriage,268 equity generally
does not allow a known donor who has entered into a contract
(orally or written) to escape liability.269 There is, however, at
least one instance where it has.270 The artificial insemination
statute must be followed for anonymous sperm donors but not for
known sperm donation.271 Some states, like Florida, respect the
contracts of known sperm donors regarding child support liability
in the context of artificial insemination while others do not. 2 7 2
But when states do not respect these contracts, they use equity,
the trial court correctly found that because the father impregnated the mother
in the 'usual and customary manner' the agreement was invalid and
unenforceable under the sperm donor statute."); Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So.
2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ("The total abdication of parental
responsibility present in the instant Preconception Agreement cannot be said to
protect the best interests of the child.").
267. See, e.g., Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. 1983).
268. See supra Part VII.A.
269. See supra note 266.
270. See Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that the known sperm donor was considered a nonparent under the
statute: "[e]ven though the parties entered into subsequent stipulations,
purportedly to give visitation rights to this nonparent, we conclude that agreement
is not enforceable. There are numerous Florida cases holding that nonparents are
not entitled to visitation rights.") (citations omitted).
271. See Baker, supra note 141, at 10 n.38; see also Brown v. Brown, 125
S.W.3d 840, 841 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) ("The trial court determined that while
the written consent required by statute had not been obtained, appellant was
'barred by the doctrine of estoppel from denying the children are his.' The sole
issue on appeal is whether the 'trial court's finding that appellant should be
legally declared the father of the minor children born during the marriage is
contrary to the weight of the evidence and is clearly erroneous.' We affirm.");
Laura WW. v. Peter WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d 258, 261-62 (App. Div. 2008).
272. See, e.g., Lamaritata, 823 So. 2d at 316.
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not to relieve donors of child support liability, but to determine
whether to impose parental rights of child support and
visitation.273 A statute would render judicial reliance on equity
less likely in deciding whether to impose or remove child support
liability.
B. Fraud in Known Donor Artificial Inseminations
Courts are more sympathetic to insemination fraud than
contraceptive fraud.274 In one intriguing Delaware case, a woman
alleged that she was pregnant with a man's child and that she
had cystic fibrosis.275 As a result, she alleged that:
[S]he needed a sperm sample for genetic testing to determine if
Father was a carrier for cystic fibrosis. Father agreed to
provide a sample for that purpose. Mother later requested a
second sperm sample after telling Father there was blood in
his semen which required another test. Father provided the
sample for the purpose of testing on February 8, 2008. He
drove Mother to the hospital that day believing he had blood in
his semen.276
Even though under the usual estoppel principles, driving a
prospective mother to the hospital for an insemination could
273. See the analysis of other cases in Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d
44, 56-57 (Ct. App. 2000):
In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 34-35 (Colo.1989) (in which an
artificial insemination agreement between an 'unmarried recipient'
and a 'known donor' to treat the latter as the father of the conceived
child, and the subsequent conduct of the donor, were found 'relevant
to preserving the donor's parental rights' despite a statute-similar to
§ 7613-precluding the assertion of parental rights and obligations by
donors"); C.M. v. C.C. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 167-68 (1977) (where the
court concluded that the semen donor's 'consent and active
participation' in the artificial insemination procedure evinced an
intent 'to assume the responsibilities of parenthood."').
274. Compare supra notes 144-51 and Part VI.B generally (there are no
acceptances of male contraceptive fraud claims in the sex context), with infra
notes 277-79 (there is at least one acceptance of male fraud claims in the
insemination context).





constitute consent, the Delaware Family Court found that under
these circumstances, which included the absence of a written
record, the father was not liable for support.277 But how is this
different from contraceptive fraud? Other than the fact that
different methods of reproduction were used, in both cases, the
man willingly "gave" his sperm sample under a pretext. If most
state courts are like this one court, then courts are more inclined
to support the removal of child support liability due to fraud
when artificial reproduction is used than they are when sex is the
method of reproduction.278 While the fraud is clearer and
arguably easier to discover when insemination is the medium
through which it occurs, both cases should be actionable.
C. Model Statute Governing Childbirth as a Result of Artificial
Insemination
State statutes in the known donor context contribute to
uncertainties that should be addressed by a single, harmonizing
statute. One California case noted, "[i]n essence, therefore, [this]
statutory scheme creates three classes of parents: mothers,
fathers who are presumed fathers, and fathers who are not
presumed fathers."279 The category of "fathers who are presumed
fathers" includes husbands and sometimes known sperm
donors.280 The category of "fathers who are not presumed fathers"
includes anonymous sperm donors, soon to be divorced fathers,281
277. Id; see RA v. CA-H., No. CN08-05726, 2010 WL 2696094, at *3 (Del.
May 3, 2010) ("Although genetic testing confirmed that he is the biological
father, Mr. A argued that he was not C's legal father because Mother had
fraudulently procured his sperm sample and used the sample in her assisted
reproduction procedures without his written consent.").
278. See supra notes 275-77 for a discussion of the success of one defrauded
male in a legal environment where contraceptive fraud claims generally fail
when sex is involved as discussed in Part VI.
279. Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 52 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
Adoption of Michael H., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445 (Cal. 1995)).
280. Id.
281. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). In
Ferguson, the court found that, "[t~he oral agreement between the parties that
appellant would donate his sperm in exchange for being released from any
obligation for any child conceived, on its face, constitutes a valid contract.
Based on legal, equitable, and moral principles, however, it is not enforceable."
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and some known sperm donors. This Article's proposed model
statute merges the two categories of fathers and equalizes the
treatment of semen in the context of familial obligations.
This model statute makes some additions to current statutes.
The model is a modified version of the Illinois Parentage Act,282
and is used because an Illinois state court judge admitted that:
In its current form, the Illinois Parentage Act fails to address
the full spectrum of legal problems facing children born as a
result of artificial insemination and other modern methods of
assisted reproduction. The rapid evolution of assisted
reproduction technology will continue to produce legal
problems similar to those presented in this case. We urge the
Illinois legislature to enact laws that are responsive to these
problems in order to safeguard the interests of children born as
a result of assisted reproductive technology.283
The original Illinois statute is in normal font, and the edits are
italicized or indicated by the use of strikethroughs.284
§ 1. This Act may be cited as the Illineis [adapt based on
jurisdiction] Parentage Act.285
§ 2. Any child or children born as the result of heterologous
artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects
the same as a naturally conceived legitimate child of the
husband and wife marriage or civil union so requesting and
consenting to the use of such technique. 286
§ 3. (a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician who is
not one of the possible biological or legal parents and with the
consent of her husband [partner as recognized by state legal
Id. This was even though she named her husband on the birth certificate, but
he had "left the marital home two years before the IVF was performed and filed
for divorce and the very day the procedure was performed . . . ." Id. In other
words, "where there is an intact family or marriage to preserve, the
presumption applies; if there is no marriage to protect that the presumption is
not applicable." Id.
282. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1 to /3 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.).
283. In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 150 (Ill. 2003).
284. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1 to /3.
285. Id. at 40/1.
286. Id. at 40/2.
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statute on same-sex union or marriage], a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband
[partner as recognized by state legal statute on same-sex union
or marriage], the husband [partner as recognized by state legal
statute on same-sex union or marriage] shall be treated in law
as if he were the natural father parent of a child thereby
conceived. The husband's [partner's as recognized by state legal
statute on same-sex union or marriage], consent must be in
writing executed and acknowledged by both the husband-and
wife parties to the marriage or union or both donors of genetic
material, if known. The physician who is to perform the
technique shall certify their signatures and the date of the
insemination, and file the husband's [partner's as recognized by
state legal statute on same-sex union or marriage or donor's]
consent in the medical record where it shall be kept
confidential and held by the patient's physician. The consent
shall also be held confidential in the city or county records
office. In the event of a dispute over paternity, the appropriate
county records office will be contacted and a confidential search
will be conducted for the insemination consent. If one is not
found, then the sperm donor or spouse will not be held liable,
regardless of estoppel. Hever, the physician's failure to dA
sch;all noet -affect the legal relationship between father affnd -hil.
All papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whether
part of the permanent medical record held by the physician or
not, are subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for
good cause shown. 287
(b) The anonymous donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other
than the donor's wife shall be treated in law as if he were not
the natural father of a child thereby conceived. If a known
donor of semen contracts to donate his specimen to a prospective
mother, that contract will also be filed with the appropriate city
or county records office. In the event of a dispute over paternity,
the appropriate county records office will be contacted and a
confidential search will be conducted for the insemination
consent. If one is not found, then the sperm donor will not be
held liable, regardless of estoppel principles.288
287. Id. at 40/3.
288. Id.
300
It is clear that current statutes, which provide for written
consent and specifically refer to physicians, are not sufficient.289
One state court noted that physicians were not always aware of
the legal requirements of artificial insemination.290 Physicians
should be required to file this written consent form with a court
or county records office, so as to add an additional formal level to
the artificial insemination process. This also adds a possible legal
liability on physicians for their positions as intermediaries in the
parent-child relationship and adds an additional procedural
requirement that could help eliminate the need for reliance upon
estoppel. The Illinois law also requires that the semen donation
be provided to a licensed physician.291 This provision will be kept
because it helps to prohibit evidentiary issues and creates proof
of parties' intentions. The provision on the licensed physician
requirement was modified to included a "licensed physician who
is not one of the possible biological or legal parents" so as to avoid
situations where the statute does not apply because the
prospective parent is his or herself a physician."292
IX. CONCLUSION
The dominant themes in the regulation of semen are sparse
evidence, privacy, non-disclosure, liability, inconsistency, fraud,
and fairness. Inconsistency exists in the following contexts:
289. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
290. Laura WW. v. Peter WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d 258, 263 (App. Div. 2008)
("[T]he need for a rebuttable presumption also clearly exists, especially so in
light of the evidence that medical personnel who conduct AID procedures are
not always aware of statutory consent requirements." (citing Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1991); Jackson v.
Jackson, 739 N.E.2d 1203, 1211 (Oh. Ct. App. 2000))).
291. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3.
292. See P.D. v. S.K., No. U-2725-07, 2007 WL 4180640, at *1 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. Nov. 16, 2007). In P.D., "[t]he respondent provided his sperm to the
petitioner who was inseminated by her same sex partner, also a physician...
[The physician] allowed his name to be put on the child's birth certificate," and
the court found that he could not deny paternity. Id. at *1-2. Therefore, it is
possible that there could be a case in which the sperm donor to a known
physician would not have allowed his name to be placed on the birth certificate,
increasing the difficulty in gathering evidence to establish paternity.
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(i) child support liability for anonymous sperm donors as
opposed to known sperm donors;
(ii) damages calculations in reproductive fraud as opposed to
damages for fraud in the transmission of disease;
(iii) parental liability for married men versus anonymous sperm
donors versus sexual assault victims (including statutory
rape victims) versus contraceptive fraud victims; and
(iv) support liability in divorce as opposed to support liability
from contracts between unmarried persons.
This Article aimed to identify these inconsistencies and
proposed statutes that addressed them in a holistic fashion based
on the concepts of fairness and uniformity. Fairness is a concept
that aims to rid the law of outdated stereotypes and to render the
state of the law more similar to the state of society. This is
especially important since many of these statutes were crafted
long ago. While the Constitution is flexible, state statutes are not
so flexible, and they cannot keep up with technology. Uniformity
within the specialty of family law recognizes that consistency
within a specialty contributes to the legislature's original goals of
protecting rape and sexual assault victims, ensuring adequate
support for children, and treating those who reproduce using
assisted reproductive technology in a similar manner as those
who reproduce using sex. One judge has summarized the problem
this Article attempts to tackle:
Marvelous advances in assisted reproductive technologies
("ART") have joined with rapidly evolving social structures so
as to implode many traditional legal assumptions about
parentage, custody, and responsibility for children. Such
assumptions, formed when the only means of reproduction was
that designed by nature, have proven too brittle to fit around
the myriad new combinations of sperm and egg, on the one
hand, and of married, unmarried, opposite-sex and same-sex
partnerships on the other. The pace of all this change has
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resulted in a crazy quilt of legal theories, statutes, and
decisional law.293
In sum, this Article has tried to render the "quilt" a little less
crazy by imposing uniformity on the treatment of semen and in
some ways, the treatment of males, in family law.
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293. Oleski v. Hynes, No. KNLFA084008415, 2008 WL 2930518, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2008).
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